6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
•
It might
take “up to nine months” to produce a division (minus), “although
this
was
understood to be the ‘sensible worst case’”.
•
Timings
were critical and the UK could not wait to see if Window 2 was
the
preferred
US option.
•
There was a
key judgement to be made about whether the UK should wait
for
an approach
from the US, “or be more forward leaning and factor a UK ‘offer
in
principle’
into US planning at an early stage”.
•
Iraq’s
chemical and biological (CB) warfare capability and intent was
a
significant
issue, “even a limited CB employment could cripple the battle
plan”.
380.
Adm Boyce
concluded that “the UK needed greater visibility of US intent in
a
number of
areas”. For the immediate future, “political guidance on how best
to start
implementing
UK intent and to convey that intent to the US” was
needed.
381.
In preparation
for a meeting to be held on 18 July, Mr Bowen outlined the
MOD
thinking in
a minute to Mr Hoon on 17 July.175
382.
Mr Bowen
drew attention to the US concepts of “running” and “generated”
starts.
He advised
that the indications were that the US favoured the “running start”
option
(which
could see US operations beginning during the course of 2002). That
would
achieve
“strategic surprise”, but it went against “our expectation of [a]
Desert Storm‑style
build up
over months”.
“In the
meantime, as we begin to explore possible UK contributions we
need
to identify
what preparation – such as procurement for urgent
operational
requirements
– could
usefully begin now …”
384.
A minute from
Mr Hoon’s Private Office to Mr Hoon stated that the
Chiefs of Staff,
notably
General Sir Mike Walker, Chief of the General Staff, had been
very sceptical
about the
US plan, which was seen as “optimistic in a number of areas”,
including:
•
the speed
of advance over large distances;
•
confidence
that the regime would implode without direct action against
the
seat of
power or Iraqi leaders;
•
reliance on
the isolation rather than the capture of Baghdad;
•
little
consideration of the practicality of the plan in a
chemical/biological
environment;
and
•
the lack of
focus on the northern areas.176
175
Minute DG
Op Pol to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 17 July 2002,
‘Iraq’.
176
Minute
[Williams] and [Watkins] to SofS [MOD], 17 July 2002, ‘Meeting on
Iraq 18 Jul 02 1145’.
233