4.4 | The
search for WMD
definitive
conclusions on some of the issues; further notes the recent
concerns
raised over
intelligence material; and calls on the Government to set up a
judicial
inquiry
finally to establish the facts of the matter.”196
397.
In the debate
that followed, Mr Ancram stated:
“The Prime
Minister and the Government have an overriding duty to be
scrupulous
and
consistent in the way that they provide intelligence material to
Parliament. Over
these last
months that has clearly not been the case. Two key areas exist …
the
status of
the evidence on weapons of mass destruction, and … the way in which
the
Government
have handled and made public the material.
…
“For
example, there was a claim about uranium from Niger going to Iraq.
The claim
was stated
as a fact in the September dossier but was subsequently shown to
have
been
partially based on forged documents. There was no explanation of
who forged
them and
why. There is no mention of CIA concerns in the Government’s
response.
We now have
a belated explanation that there were other sources of
intelligence
that
apparently cannot be disclosed. Even more unusually we are told
such sources
cannot be
shared with the United States.
…
“Some will
ask whether the dodgy dossier really matters. The fact that the
Prime
Minister
misrepresented its provenance goes to the heart of the trust that
Parliament
can put in
what he tells it is, or is not, intelligence …
“The
erosion of public confidence is gathering pace and beginning to
damage the
national
interest …
“There is
an urgent unanswerable case for the Government to set up
an
independent
judicial inquiry …”197
398.
Mr Straw
tabled the Government’s amendment.198
He stated that
an independent
judicial
inquiry, whether set up under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence)
Act 1921 or
not, “can
be frustrating for the public because of the duration and the costs
involved”.
It was also
quite wrong to assume that such inquiries “automatically bring such
issues
to a
close”.
“A vote for
the Opposition’s motion would be a vote of no confidence in
the
Intelligence
and Security Committee … It would also be a vote of no confidence
in
196
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
16 July 2003, column 287.
197
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
16 July 2003, columns 288-293.
198
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
16 July 2003, column 296.
501