The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
585.
In January,
with no timetable for the publication of the next ISG
report,
Mr Howard
proposed a number of options. He recommended that the
best
approach
might be to draw a line under the issue of WMD by summer
2004.
586.
On
21 January, after visiting the ISG in Qatar, Baghdad and
Basra, Mr Howard
reported “a
sense of uncertainty and lack of strategic direction” at the ISG
headquarters
in Baghdad:
Dr Kay’s successor had not been identified; the timing of future
ISG
reports was
not known; and there was continuing debate about the extent of the
ISG
contribution
on counter-terrorism.326
Security
remained an issue, but ISG staff morale
seemed high
and people were working “incredibly hard”.
587.
Mr Howard
assessed that, despite the good work being done, the overall
picture
was not
fundamentally different to that described in the Interim
Report.
588.
On the future
of the ISG, Mr Howard suggested that the right option might be
to
draw a line
under the issue of Iraqi WMD by summer 2004. There was no guarantee
that
the new
Iraqi Government would be prepared to allow the ISG to continue
after it took
office and
there was a possibility that the ISG’s final analysis would look
like the Interim
Report:
clear Iraqi intent to preserve and conceal an ability to
reconstitute programmes,
but no
operational or current production capability.
589.
Mr Howard
identified three options for the next ISG report:
•
a single,
final report around June;
•
the major
substantive report in March or April, with loose ends tied up in
June or
July;
or
•
a low-key
report focused on context and operating environment in March, with
a
substantive
report in June.
590.
On
22 January, Mr Scarlett produced a summary of the ISG’s
findings and
possible
points for Mr Blair to make in public.
591.
Mr Scarlett
sent No.10 a paper summarising the “current understanding” of
the
ISG’s
findings on 22 January.327
The paper
had been prepared within the Assessments
Staff, in
consultation with Mr Howard, but it had been given a limited
distribution. It was
not the
result of a full JIC Assessment and had not been considered by a
CIG.
592.
The paper
summarised what had been found, what remained to be done
and
questions
raised by the ISG’s work:
326
Letter
Howard to Scarlett, 21 January 2004, ‘Iraq WMD: Visit to Iraq
Survey Group: 16-19 January’.
327
Minute
Scarlett to Rycroft, 22 January 2004, ‘Iraq: WMD’ attaching
Paper [unattributed],
22 January
2004, ‘Iraq: WMD’.
540