Executive
Summary
200.
The British
Embassy Washington reported overnight on 5/6 March that
“barring
a highly
improbable volte face by Saddam”, the US was now firmly on track
for military
action and
would deal firmly with any efforts in the UN to slow down the
timetable.90
201.
The Embassy
reported that the only event which might significantly affect the
US
timetable
would be problems for the UK. That had been described as “huge –
like trying
to play
football without the quarterback”. The US was “therefore pulling
out all the stops
at the UN”.
The US fully understood the importance of the second resolution for
the UK.
202.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that the US would not countenance the use
of
benchmarks.
That risked delaying the military timetable.91
203.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 6 March that the argument boiled down to the
question of
whether
Saddam Hussein would ever voluntarily co‑operate with the UN to
disarm Iraq.92
204.
Mr Blair
concluded that it was for the Security Council to determine whether
Iraq
was
co‑operating fully.
205.
In his
discussions with President Lagos on 6 March, Mr Blair stated
that the US
would go
ahead without the UN if asked to delay military action until April
or May.93
206.
In his report
to the Security Council on 7 March, Dr Blix stated that there
had
been an
acceleration of initiatives from Iraq since the end of January, but
they could
not be said
to constitute immediate co‑operation.94
Nor did
they necessarily cover all
areas of
relevance; but they were nevertheless welcome. UNMOVIC was drawing
up a
work
programme of key disarmament tasks, which would be ready later that
month, for
approval by
the Security Council. It would take “months” to complete the
programme.
207.
Dr ElBaradei
reported that there were no indications that Iraq had resumed
nuclear
activities
since the inspectors left in December 1998 and the recently
increased level
of Iraqi
co‑operation should allow the IAEA to provide the Security Council
with an
assessment
of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities in the near future.
208.
There was
unanimity in calls for Iraq to increase its co‑operation. But there
was a
clear
division between the US, UK, Spain and Bulgaria who spoke in favour
of a further
resolution
and France, Germany, Russia and China and most other Member
States
who spoke
in favour of continuing to pursuing disarmament through
strengthened
inspections.
209.
The UK, US and
Spain circulated a revised draft resolution deciding that
Iraq
would have
failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441
(2002) unless
90
Telegram
294 Washington to FCO London, 6 March 2003, ‘Personal Iraq: UN
Endgame’.
91
Telegram
353 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 5
March’.
92
Cabinet
Conclusions, 6 March 2003.
93
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with President of Chile,
6 March’.
94
UN Security
Council, ‘4714th Meeting Friday 7 March 2003’
(S/PV.4714).
29