The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
504.
Mr Jeffrey’s
minute stated that the requirement for PPVs was “distinct from
the
armoured
vehicle capability, but PPV may help to mitigate shortfalls over
the next few
years”. The
Vector contract “for at least 62 vehicles” was imminent and
“options to
deliver
more” would be considered in the planning round.
505.
On 24 April,
Maj Gen Rollo told ECAB that co‑ordinated work on “the
FRES/AV
Gap” was
“in hand for STP/EP07 and STP/EP08”.263
Two
programme reviews were
ongoing,
including an Armoured Vehicle strategy and “Armoured Vehicle
Through Life
Management
Plan”. Lord Drayson “was fully engaged in this issue and the Army
should
capitalise
on this”.
506.
Mr Des
Browne replaced Dr Reid as Defence Secretary in May
2006.
507.
On 25 May,
Mr Browne was advised by a junior MOD official to write to
Mr Stephen
Timms,
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, to seek an uplift in UOR funding
to begin
up‑armouring
the FV430 fleet for Iraq “as soon as possible”.264
A business
case for
£6m to
procure the “long‑lead items” for this project had been approved in
April 2006.
508.
The FV430
fleet had not previously operated outside MNF bases as they fell
short
of the
force protection levels required, but Mr Browne
stated:
“It is
anticipated that there will be an increasing requirement for the
FV430 fleet to
deploy in a
more overt capacity over the coming months, necessitating
appropriate
protection
against the associated exposure to prevalent threats.”
509.
Mr Timms
approved the proposal on 15 June.265
510.
On 21 June,
the DMB received two presentations; one about medium
weight
capability,
and one about FRES.266
The minutes
do not make clear what constituted
medium
weight capability for the purposes of the meeting but stated that
it was a
valuable
“over the horizon” capability that was much broader than FRES,
although
FRES
“formed an important part of it”. It was a joint capability to
which all three Services
contributed.
It did not appear from the minutes that either presentation related
to PPVs.
511.
The DMB
concluded that FRES was the Army’s highest priority
equipment
programme
after support to operations. FRES would be in service for many
decades
and it
would be essential that there was growth potential and realism
about timelines.
The Board
noted “with concern” that the programme was taking longer than
originally
anticipated.
That was attributed to the time it had taken to understand the
requirement
properly,
to plan, research and de‑risk the programme. The delays were
operationally
263
Minutes, 24
April 2006, Executive Committee of the Army Board
meeting.
264
Note MOD
[junior official] to PS/SoS [MOD] 25 May 2006, ‘Iraq – Additional
Funding for Urgent
Operational
Requirements (UORs)’ attaching Letter [draft] SoS [MOD] to Chief
Secretary [Treasury],
undated,
‘Iraq – Additional Funding for Urgent Operational
Requirements’.
265
Letter
Timms to Browne, 15 June 2006, ‘Iraq – Urgent Operational
Requirements (UORs)’.
266
Minutes, 21
June 2006, Defence Management Board meeting.
84