3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
suffer”. It
was time for the Council to send a “clear message” to Saddam
Hussein about
the
political will of the Council and its willingness to use force, if
necessary, to achieve
the
disarmament of Iraq.
1111.
Secretary
Powell concluded that the draft resolution for action by the
Council
was appropriate,
and that it should be put to a vote “in the very near future”. He
added:
“The clock
continues to tick and the consequences of Saddam Hussein’s
continued
refusal to
disarm will be very, very real.”
1112.
Mr Ivanov
stated that the Council’s “united, energetic efforts” and the
pressure on
Iraq “from
all sides, including the build up of a military presence” had
produced progress
in
implementing resolution 1441. There was “a real disarmament process
in Iraq for the
first time
in many years”.
1113.
Mr Ivanov
said that he “agreed in principle” with Dr Blix that if the
latest steps
taken by
Baghdad had been taken earlier, “the results could be more
convincing”.
But they
opened the way to resolving outstanding problems. In those
circumstances,
Mr Ivanov
questioned whether it was “now reasonable to halt inspections” and
resort to
force.
Russia was “firmly in favour of continuing and strengthening
inspection activities
and making
them more focused”. The UNMOVIC work programme should include
a
list of key
disarmament tasks which should be “formulated with utmost clarity”
and be
realisable:
“That would allow us to evaluate objectively Iraq’s level of
co-operation and,
most
importantly, to provide an exhaustive answer to all the remaining
open questions
regarding
banned Iraqi military programmes.”
1114.
Mr Ivanov
concluded with a plea that the differences in the Security
Council
should not
produce a rift, and that:
“Only by
acting in solidarity will we effectively face up to new global
threats and
challenges.
We are certain that the Security Council has to emerge united
and
strong from
the Iraq crisis, not weakened and divided. Russia will continue to
work
towards
that goal.”
1115.
Mr de
Villepin stated that the inspectors had revealed that Iraq had been
actively
co-operating
for a month. He asked why, in those circumstances, the Security
Council
should
engage in a war with Iraq and “smash instruments that have just
proved their
effectiveness”.
It was “clear to all that in Iraq, we are resolutely moving towards
the
complete
elimination of weapons of mass destruction
programmes”.
1116.
Mr de
Villepin argued that the Council should proceed “with
information,
verification,
destruction”; and Iraq had to provide “further information in a
timely fashion”.
Iraq was
less of a danger than in 1991. Diplomatic action was bearing fruit
and the
American
and British presence in the region lent support to the
international community’s
collective
resolve.
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