The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of my
professional judgement and that of my colleagues in [the]
Assessment Staff”.284
They had
been “prompted to look again” at that passage by Mr Powell’s
email, of
19 September,
in the context of the “instructions from the JIC to keep what we
were
writing in
line with standing JIC assessments and also with recent
intelligence”:
“When we
looked at it again, we realised … that there was no standing
JIC
assessment
which made it clear whether we were defining Saddam’s threat
…
or CW
posture … as defensive or offensive. More to the point, there was
recent
reporting,
in addition, which was not reflected here, but which was quite
clear
reporting,
which placed his attachment to CBW and the importance that he
placed
on it very
much in the context of his perception of his regional position, his
plan to
acquire and
maintain regional influence and, as one report, and maybe more,
put
it: to
dominate his neighbours. In other words, the recent intelligence
was more
complex …
Bearing those points in mind, we concluded that this was not right
and
therefore
we took that out.”
551.
Mr Webb
sent Mr Hoon a copy of the draft dossier on 20 September,
advising that
it had been
“given an extremely restricted circulation (essentially JIC members
only)”
and that he
had “no discretion to copy this document further”.285
Arrangements
were
being made
to brief Opposition leaders, Select Committee chairs and junior
ministers
on 23
September before the debate on 24 September, and key
allies.
552.
Mr Webb
told Mr Hoon that AM French’s staff had been “closely
associated with
the
preparation of the detail of the dossier” and he understood they
were “content from
a
professional DIS point of view with the judgements” it contained.
The paragraphs on
the
acquisition of aluminium tubes and nuclear timelines were “more
cautious” than
US Department
of Defence views and no consultation with the US was
planned
“outside intelligence
and White House channels”.
553.
Mr Webb
concluded that he had:
“… some
reservations as a JIC member about citing the Committee’s views
explicitly
(lest we
become less usefully direct in our future judgements) but the way
this has
been
achieved has reassured me.
“Overall I
am content to recommend the material …”
554.
The record of
Mr Scarlett’s meeting at 1300 on 20 September stated that
copies
of the
dossier would be made available for Cabinet on 23
September.286
284
The
National Archives, 28 January 2004, Report of
the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Death of Dr
David Kelly [“The Hutton
Report”], paragraph 215.
285
Minute Webb
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq
Dossier’.
286
Minute
[Cabinet Office] to Rycroft and others, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq
Dossier: Public Handling
and Briefing’.
216