14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
416.
On 13 October,
a DIS report of the technical influence of foreign fighters on
the
insurgencies
in Iraq judged:
“Of key
concern is the possible state sponsorship of insurgent groups in
Iraq.
Highly
lethal Improvised Explosive Devices of Lebanese Hizballah origin,
probably
migrating
from Iran to Iraq, continue to pose a significant challenge to
coalition
forces and
in particular the UK forces in MND(SE).”212
417.
The DIS report
continued:
“The
development of the IED capability in Iraq has been rapid. By way
of
comparison,
the level of IED expertise reached by the IRA over some 30 years
of
conflict in
Northern Ireland has been far exceeded by Iraqi insurgents in less
than
three
years. This rapid progress is largely attributable to the technical
influence of
foreign
fighters, many of whom view Iraq as the centre of a global
jihad.”
418.
Following a
visit to Iraq from 10 to 13 October, Gen Jackson
reported:
“Much of
MND(SE)’s tactical focus has been on countering the EFP/PIR
threat.
TTPs have
been amended and Project M* is delivering an effective interim
technical
countermeasure.
But the enemy will adapt too, so we remain alive to the threat
for
some time
yet. It is clear that the Scientific Advisor and his team in HQ
MND(SE)
have been
instrumental in developing these countermeasures so rapidly
and
419.
It was agreed
on 14 October that 14 Warrior vehicles that were due to be
returned
to the UK
should remain in Iraq.214
An
additional Merlin helicopter would also be
provided.
420.
On 18 October,
Sergeant Chris Hickey, who had disembarked from his
vehicle,
was killed
in Basra when his patrol was hit by an IED.215
421.
At the end of
October, Dr Reid reported to Cabinet that UK forces had, since
May,
been
attacked by “a new type of bomb which had previously been
associated mainly
422.
On 31 October,
Dr Reid wrote to Mr Des Browne, Chief Secretary to the
Treasury,
to request
an increase in the UOR funding, predominantly to cover £30m funding
for the
initial
roll‑out of the M* capability.217
212
Report DIS,
13 October 2005, ‘The Technical Influence of Foreign Fighters on
the Iraqi Insurgency’.
213
Report CGS
to CDS, 18 October 2005, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq: 10‑13 Oct
05’.
214
Minute
ACDS(Ops) to PJHQ – DCJO(Ops), 14 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Additional
Resources to Counter
Increased
IED Threat in MND(SE)’.
215
GOV.UK,
20 October
2005, Sergeant
Chris Hickey of 1st Battalion the Coldstream Guards killed in
Iraq.
216
Cabinet
Conclusions, 27 October 2005.
217
Letter
Browne to Reid, 11 November 2005, ‘Iraq – Urgent Operational
Requirements (UORs)’.
71