3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
480.
Mr Ricketts
wrote that he and Sir David Manning had discussed a variant
of
the approach
Sir David had set out in his conversation with Dr Rice on 14
February.
That was
to use the French proposal for a ministerial discussion in the
Security
Council on
14 March to provide a deadline for asking Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei to
state
whether Iraq was “in full and active co-operation”, including a
demand that Iraq
destroy its
prohibited rocket motors, which would then be taken as the basis
for a
resolution.
Dr Rice’s initial reaction had been maybe, but she had wanted
a deadline of
28
February. Mr Ricketts and Sir David thought that was too soon
and would not allow
sufficient
time to rally middle-ground opinion. A 14 March deadline “should
still fit with
other time
lines and demonstrate that we are listening to those who call for
more time”.
481.
Mr Ricketts
conceded that the proposal was “not a brilliant strategy” but it
“might
be a
way forward avoiding signals of weakness”.
482.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that more time would be needed and
that
the
inspectors should be given the chance to deliver a judgement which
would
convince
the Council.
483.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that the UK could table a resolution the
following
week.131
The
existing version would “not get nine votes, but it will signal the
beginning
of the
end game and Council minds will have to concentrate within a harder
context”.
In his
view, the “Best area for plan B options” was “some kind of loaded
ultimatum”.
484.
Sir Jeremy’s
view was that postponing the discussion to 14 March would
not
be
sufficient to secure support: “If the judgement is left to Blix,
e.g. to say whether or
not Iraq
has co-operated ‘immediately, actively and unconditionally’”, he
“may not be
capable of
taking the heat or Council members may try to alter the terms in
their favour”.
485.
There would
also be a problem with the US. Sir Jeremy reported that
Ambassador
Negroponte
had told him that President Bush would not agree to anything
which
changed the
terms of 1441 (especially OP2), or altered their current legal
foundation
for action,
or ensnared the Council in endless argument about interpretation.
The
current US
thinking was to table their draft mid-week and to set a date
(probably the
end of
February) for a vote.
486.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he had told Ambassador Negroponte “in general
terms”
that more
would be needed:
“Ideally,
we should not move to the use of force without a find, a smoking
gun.
We should
maximise the possibilities for that. We should expose the
French
reinforcement
proposals as clearly inadequate for the disarmament of Iraq:
indeed,
no
proposition other than war has yet been made which will
realistically achieve that –
something I
said in terms to EU HOMS [Heads of Mission] meeting this
morning.”
131
Telegram
270 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 February 2003, ‘Personal Iraq
Next Steps’.
267