9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
169.
Although not
mentioned in the Cabinet Office record, C (Sir John Scarlett)
noted
that
Mr Blair supported contact with Badr, and that Mr Blair
had been in favour for some
time of
opening up channels to whomever was possible on the Shia side,
including
170.
C noted that
the official record should make it clear that authority had now
been
given for
“Badr and indeed whoever else” to be contacted.
171.
When the Iraq
Strategy Group discussed Op SALAMANCA the following day,
they
were
reminded that Prime Minister Maliki had yet to endorse the plan and
agreed that it
could not
proceed without his approval.112
172.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald briefed the Group on “the Prime Minister’s strong view
that we
should
encourage Maliki to reach a political accommodation with Sadr … All
channels
for
improving contact with Sadr and Sistani should be
explored.”
173.
Maj Gen
Shirreff reported on 15 September that he had invested
considerable
effort in
the previous week gaining support for Op SALAMANCA
locally.113
He
reported
that Maj
Gen Hamadi had been “thoroughly briefed” and “appears to have
taken
ownership
of it, showing a clear understanding of what is
involved”.
174.
The chairman
of the Provincial Oversight Committee had reservations
about
the plan,
particularly the involvement of MNF troops. Maj Gen Shirreff noted
that this
“underline[d]
the careful path we have to tread to maintain
consent”.
175.
Maj Gen
Shirreff outlined the reasons for Op SALAMANCA, which he
described
as “the
operation that will determine whether we will achieve PIC in
Basra”:
“Doing
nothing is not an option and will not achieve PIC in 2007, let
alone early
2007
because of the lack of security. Quite simply, the security
situation in Basra
is bad
and likely to get worse. During disengagement a vacuum was created
which
the
militant militias and the death squads filled and which MNF force
and activity
levels have
been unable to counter. The number of killings in Basra increased
…
any
progress made in developing the police force was reversed and
attacks on MNF
continued.
Though there has been some progress … [it] is too slow and too
fragile.
Crucially,
the police are still incapable of providing even the most basic
level of
security;
rather they are a major cause of insecurity …
“Next, we
must counter the perception among Basrawis that MNF has not done,
and
is not
doing, anything to improve their quality of life, which is
resulting in diminishing
levels of
consent …
111 Minute C,
18 September 2006, ‘DOP: Meeting of 14 September
2006’.
112
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 18 September 2006,
‘Iraq Strategy Group,
15
September 2006’.
113
Minute
Shirreff, 15 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
15 September 2006’.
35