The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

322. Mr Blair said that any significant obstruction or discovery of WMD would

constitute a breach. The inspectors should report the facts and we should make

the judgements.

323. Mr Blair told President Bush that if the UN did not authorise force in the

event of a breach, the US and UK would still act.

324. The issues of what would constitute a breach and who would decide on the

appropriate action were key issues in the negotiation of the resolution and its

subsequent interpretation.

325. In the second conversation with President Bush, Mr Blair proposed that OP10

should be amended to read:

“Decides that false statements and omissions in the declaration submitted by Iraq

to the Council and failure by Iraq at any time to comply and co‑operate fully in

accordance with the provisions laid out in this resolution shall constitute a further

flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions, and expresses its readiness

to authorise all means necessary to restore international peace and security

in the area.”109

326. In exchange, Mr Blair said the US and UK should “hang tough” on OP5 [the

arrangements for intrusive inspections] and on material breach in OP1. When the

first resolution was passed the US and UK should make clear that, in the event of

non‑compliance, “we would expect the Security Council to authorise the use of force”. If

for any reason it were not to do so, “we would go ahead anyway, on the Kosovo model”.

327. Mr Blair and President Bush also discussed what would constitute a breach and

who would decide.

328. Mr Blair said that if Iraq declared it had no WMD and the inspectors then found a

significant amount, it “would be a casus belli”; any significant obstruction or discovery of

WMD would constitute a breach. That was not a judgement for Dr Blix; “the inspectors

should report the facts, and we should make the judgements”.

329. In a subsequent telephone call Secretary Powell told Mr Straw that he and Dr Rice

were about to discuss the UK proposal.110

330. In a fifth conversation that evening Secretary Powell told Mr Straw that the

US “were buying into” Mr Blair’s proposal, but “there would need to be a lot of work

done on it”.111

331. Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair and Mr Straw had had “a very difficult meeting

early on” when Mr Straw had explained that the US was “getting very jittery about the

109 Letter Rycroft to Sedwill, 2 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Telephone Calls with Bush, 2 October’.

110 Letter Straw to Manning, 2 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversations with Colin Powell’.

111 Letter Straw to Manning, 3 October 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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