9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
require
draw down in Iraq. As we have said continually, that will be based
on conditions
in Iraq
itself.”
549.
In the debate
that followed, Dr Reid commented that he did not consider
that
“building a
modern Afghanistan … will be an easy or a short
process”.261
Part of
the
reason, in
his view, was that “unlike Iraq”, Afghanistan lacked:
•
a central
corporate governance, in tradition and structure;
•
a developed
middle class; and
•
mineral
resources.
550.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry that the proposal to deploy significant numbers
to
Afghanistan
had come from the MOD:
“… they
said it is going to be tough for us, but they said we can do it and
we should
do it. So
in a sense, right at the moment it was difficult in Iraq, we were
prepared to
make the
additional commitment to Afghanistan.”262
551.
In his weekly
report on 29 January, Lt Gen Houghton wrote:
“I am aware
that there are many in London who would like a greater degree
of
certainty
about the viability of UK transition plans. I judge that, for the
moment, I am
not able to
give such reassurances … the process for the transfer of security
control
in the
provinces must rest on political and security decisions made in
Baghdad …
and both
decisions have attendant problems:
a.
Political – The (Iraqi) political problem regarding decision-making
is primarily
one of
timing. If the new government is not seated until April, then
the
desired
window for the transfer of Maysan will come under severe
pressure.
But at
least the decision itself will be an easy one since the new
government
are likely
to seize on the political benefits that derive from the early
transition
of certain
provinces.
b. Security
– The security decision is a more complex one. It is less an
issue
of meeting
the stipulated conditions and more an issue of whether or
not
General
Casey is content with our plan. The most disturbing element of
the
plan – as
viewed through US eyes – is the intent to physically vacate
Maysan
Province,
with the (potentially wrongly) inferred possibility of a less
secure
border … My
judgement is that our plan is sound and will result in a
situation
in which
the border could receive more focused attention and the
likelihood
of violence
will reduce, since so much of it is simply an emotive
response
to our
presence. But we should not underestimate the US concerns
about
261
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 26
January 2006, columns 1529-1533.
262
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 224.
263
Minute
Houghton to CDS, 29 January 2006, ‘SMBR-I Weekly Report (196) 29
January 06’.
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