The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1104.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit, who had recently visited Baghdad, judged that “while we
were
not losing
the security battle, we were entering a new and very dangerous
phase”.
1105.
Mr Hoon
commented that the security situation was very different in the
South.
He noted
the difficult situation faced by UK forces in Maysan, who were
sustaining
22 percent
casualties. That could not continue indefinitely, and root causes
such as
unemployment
needed to be examined.
1106.
On 18 June,
Mr Martin Howard, MOD Director General Operational
Policy,
submitted
advice to Mr Hoon on the options for deploying the ARRC,
intended to result
in a
decision ahead of the forthcoming NATO summit, which was thought to
be an ideal
opportunity
to inform other countries and announce a
deployment.631
1107.
The submission
listed three options:
•
deployment
to Afghanistan in 2006;
•
deployment
to Iraq; or
•
remaining
as part of the NATO Reaction Force.
1108.
Mr Howard
did not recommend which option should be selected. He
asked
Mr Hoon
to agree that “if Ministers decide against deployment to Iraq …
there are sound
military
and political reasons for committing the ARRC to Afghanistan in
mid-2006”. That
“would
chime well with plans for strategic handoff in Iraq around
mid-06”.
1109.
Mr Howard
suggested that, while deployments to either Afghanistan or Iraq
might
reinforce
the ARRC’s operational credentials, deployment to Iraq could
“undermine its
position as
a reliable NATO asset”. He wrote:
“The
obvious conclusion is that a decision in favour of Iraq would need
to be
supported
by a very strong political or military rationale, preferably both;
stewardship
of the
forthcoming elections, where HQ ARRC has the potential to have an
effect
in creating
the right security conditions, could be a factor in this respect.
Overall,
however,
the political rationale remains opaque with latest assessments of
the
timelag in
deployment weakening any obvious operational
rationale.”
1110.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit wrote to Mr Hoon on 21 June to say that he
endorsed
Mr Howard’s
submission, recommending that “we instead earmark the ARRC
for
1111.
Sir Kevin had
recently returned from a visit to Iraq and reported that the
ARRC
deployment
had been raised with him by two US Generals and by Ambassador
Bremer,
who saw it
as supporting the training of the Iraqi Armed Forces
because:
631
Minute
Howard to PS/SofS [MOD], 18 June 2004, ‘HQ ARRC Deployment
Options’.
632
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 21 June 2004, ‘HQ ARRC
Deployment’.
390