9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
240.
On the front
of Mr Powell’s minute, Mr Blair wrote:
“I agree
with all of this. You will have to spend much time pushing it
through.”116
241.
On 23
September, Mr Straw chaired a meeting attended by Dr
Reid,
Mr Hilary
Benn, the International Development Secretary (by telephone), Gen
Walker,
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald and other officials from No.10, the MOD and the FCO to
discuss
advice on
South-East Iraq, and in particular the impact of the Jameat
incident.117
242.
Mr Straw
told those present that Mr Blair required a paper which
“examined”
current
policy. Sir Nigel emphasised that advice was needed on how to deal
with the
political
and security strands of the existing policy; Mr Blair was not
expecting “a sudden
lurch in
any direction away from our current plan”.
243.
In his Iraq
update on 23 September, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary told
Mr Blair that
Sir Nigel
had emphasised that the UK must not be complacent because
“internationally
– including
in the Arab media and Washington – there were serious questions
being
asked about
our strategy in the South-East”.118
Sir Nigel
was also reported to have said:
“… we were
looking for a smarter and more effective strategy, which was
likely
to mean us
being more active in certain areas. But no one was suggesting eg
a
significant
increase in force levels.”
244.
A record of
the meeting by Dr Reid’s Private Secretary said that:
“During
discussion it was stressed that the [Jameat] incident … should be
seen as a
relatively
minor one which had resulted in a great deal of media attention.
But on the
ground
reporting had now confirmed that the atmospherics in Basra were
returning
to normal,
though the Governor and Provincial Council were still refusing to
engage
with MNF-I.
That said, the Consul [General] in Basra had reported that
normal
engagement
and outreach should be possible by early next week. It was also
clear
that … the
IPS showed no diminution of support.”119
“… that the
[Jameat] incident would probably prove to be a blip but it had
highlighted
the need to
review the overall strategy and ensure we were on the right
track.”
116
Manuscript
comment Blair to Powell on Minute Powell to Prime Minister, 21
September 2005,
‘Iraq: Strategy’.
117
Letter
Naworynsky to Asquith, 26 September 2005, ‘Meeting to Discuss South
East Iraq: Impact of
Security
Incident in Basrah’.
118
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 23 September 2005, ‘Iraq
Update’.
119
Letter
Naworynsky to Asquith, 26 September 2005, ‘Meeting to Discuss South
East Iraq: Impact of
Security
Incident in Basrah’.
529