6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
214.
Mr Brown
and Mr Hoon met separately on 23 September to agree the
process for
funding
UORs.100
Mr Brown
agreed the MOD’s proposal to adopt a similar approach
for
managing
Iraq UORs to that already in place for Afghanistan UORs, with an
initial ceiling
of
£150m.
215.
Mr Hoon
undertook to provide “a broad breakdown of this sum”, which he set
out
in a letter
to Mr Brown on 25 September.101
While he
highlighted that “requirements and
priorities
may of course change” as US planning developed, Mr Hoon wrote
that the first
tranche of
measures might include:
•
strategic
and theatre communications (approximately £25m to
£35m);
•
Special
Forces, including communications and air support
(approximately
£40m to
£60m);
•
force
protection measures, including items such as defensive aids for
aircraft
and NBC
equipment (approximately £20m to £40m); and
•
initial
logistic support, campaign infrastructure and spares (£50m to
£100m).
216.
MOD and
Treasury officials were tasked to work out the detailed
arrangements.
Mr Brown
would write to Mr Hoon with proposals for handling UORs above
the
£150m ceiling.
217.
On
26 September, Mr McKane met Mr Jonathan Stephens,
Treasury Director
Public
Services, “to follow up” the meeting between Mr Hoon and
Mr Brown.102
218.
Mr McKane
explained that the total volume of UORs was likely to cost more
than
£150m but
the MOD was not yet in a position to say by how much.
219.
Mr McKane
also explained that the MOD might wish to use the £150m for
“items
that were
not strictly speaking UORs” such as force generation
costs.
220.
The Treasury
“did not demur” on either point.
221.
Mr McKane
reported that the Treasury asked when Mr Hoon:
“ … was
likely to come forward with a firm recommendation on the overall
scale of
the British
contribution. I said that this was likely to be within the next few
weeks
and that
obviously the financial cost of the options would be one of the
factors to
be weighed
in the balance.”
222.
Mr David
Williams, MOD Director, Directorate Capabilities, Resources and
Scrutiny
(DCRS),
wrote to the Treasury on 2 October, proposing a set of
criteria for agreeing
UORs
against the Reserve.103
100
Letter Hoon
to Brown, 25 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Urgent Operational
Requirements’.
101
Letter Hoon
to Brown, 25 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Urgent Operational
Requirements’.
102
Minute DG
RP to Finance Director, 26 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Urgent
Operational Requirements’.
103
Letter
Williams to Treasury [junior official], 2 October 2002, ‘UOR
Criteria’.
33