6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
982.
Early in
December, the British Embassy Amman issued its November update
on
Iraq.474
Unlike
previous updates, which had only been sent to FCO addressees,
the
November
report was copied to DFID and DIS.
983.
The Embassy
reported the recent release of all prisoners from Iraqi jails,
noting
that the
policy had been criticised within and outside Iraq for causing a
rise in crime.
It also
provided a general assessment of Iraqi public opinion:
“Iraqis do
not want a war because they do not know what is next. (But they
fully
expect that
a war will come) …
“Iraqis do
not want a ‘US occupation’ …
“The
biggest common denominator to emerge is that the Iraqi people do
not know
who to
trust. They do not trust the US because they ‘abandoned’ them in
1991. They
do not
trust the regime or its religious men. They do not trust the
opposition (who are
corrupt or
in the pockets of foreign governments). And they do not trust each
other
… Any
serious discussions tend to take place only within the very inner
core of a
family. All
this makes an organised revolt seem improbable.”
984.
Over 300
representatives of a wide range of Iraqi opposition groups attended
the
conference
in London from 14 to 17 December, which agreed a “Policy Statement
of
the Iraqi
Opposition”, a paper on the post-Saddam Hussein transition to
democracy and
appointed a
65 member co-ordinating committee.475
985.
The FCO
Research Analyst who attended the event reported “a palpable sense
of
relief” at
those achievements, but predicted that:
“… given
the intense differences displayed over the weekend and the
chequered
history of
opposition conferences any show of unity is unlikely to last and
there are
enough
people excluded who will already be briefing the press … [T]he US
will be
unhappy at
having such an unwieldy 65 to deal with.”476
986.
Those
conclusions were echoed in the FCO Annual Review for Iraq, written
in
January
2003 by Research Analysts in the absence of an embassy in
Baghdad.477
The Review
commented extensively on US involvement with Iraqi exiles. The
US
had
encouraged the Iraqi opposition to convene and fund a conference to
overcome
emerging
rivalries. After several postponements and changes of venue, the
conference
had been
held in London and funded by the US. Competition between groups
“cast
doubt on
whether a credible new front can emerge” and press reports
suggested those
groups had
been “written out of the US’s Iraq script”. The Review also
suggested that
474
Teleletter
Amman [junior official] to MED [junior official], 4 December 2002,
‘Iraq: November sitrep’.
475
BBC
News, 16
December 2002, Disputes
mar Iraqi opposition talks; Telegram
111 FCO London to
Amman, 17
December 2002, ‘Iraq: Opposition Conference 14-17
December’.
476
Telegram
111 FCO London to Amman, 17 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Opposition
Conference
14-17
December’.
477
Teleletter
Wilson to Abu Dhabi, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Annual Review,
2002’.
279