The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“In Autumn 2000, ahead of the US Presidential election, the Government

initiated a stock-take of Iraq policy in order to be ready to engage with a new US

Administration, which was expected to undertake its own review, irrespective of who

won the election.”21

20. Sir Peter Ricketts, Chairman of the JIC until September 2001 and subsequently

FCO Political Director until July 2003, told the Inquiry that the Government’s view at this

time was that “containment policy was failing and the rate of failure was accelerating”.22

Sir Peter set out the background to the review:

“We were very aware … that international support for this structure of sanctions and

deterrence was eroding, both in the region and in the Security Council.

“The net effect of that was that Saddam Hussein in Iraq was feeling pretty

comfortable. He had substantial illegal revenues from which he could pursue

patronage inside Iraq and continue the efforts to procure materials for his weapons

of mass destruction programme. He was busy restoring his standing in the Arab

world by very visible support for the Palestinian intifada, which was another major

issue that was happening at that time.

“There were no inspectors in the country to inspect his weapons programme and

the US/UK sanctions policy was … unpopular. He was able to put the blame for the

suffering of the Iraqi people on the West. So our review of the policy … was really

designed to try to regain the initiative …”23

21. The Inquiry heard different perspectives on the degree to which the policy of

containment was sustainable.

22. Sir John Sawers, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs from January 1999

to September 2001, told the Inquiry:

“… we [the UK Government] didn’t feel that our policy was failing; we felt that the

policy of containment we had in place was having a significant effect. That there

was still Iraqi activity, especially on chemical and biological elements, that was hard

to explain. We couldn’t get our UN inspectors in place … But the main concern was

the costs of our policy in the wider Arab world and international opinion and the

vulnerability we faced in terms of the monitoring of the No-Fly Zones.”24

23. Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff from 1997 to 2007, told the Inquiry that

“Containment was dying in 2001”, and that:

“The reason, in 2001, that people were looking at smart sanctions was because

sanctions weren’t working. They were hurting the wrong people. People were really

21 Statement, 8 December 2010, page 2.

22 Public hearing, 24 November 2009, page 13.

23 Public hearing, 24 November 2009, pages 14-15.

24 Public hearing, 10 December 2009, page 22.

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