10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
difference
to the people of Iraq if they are resolved”, and advice on how to
improve the
Iraqi
media.
423.
Mr Rycroft
subsequently told Mr Chilcott, who had been tasked to produce
that list
of
outstanding practical issues, that Mr Blair was “looking for
some really big ticket items
to push”,
along the lines of:
“1. Get x
people in to sort out the police.
2. Move y
US forces from a to b to improve security.
3. Get
Bechtel to build by X date a new power station in place
y.
4. Ask x
big figure person to go to Iraq to sort out the TV.
5.
currency.
6. CPA
internal.
7. setting
up IIA.
8. Basra –
give CPA Basra $x million, and … etc etc.” 239
424.
Mr Rycroft
added that Mr Blair did not need “lots of analysis of what’s
going wrong
… he knows
that”. He needed “things that are concrete and ambitious enough so
that
if/when
they happen they really transform the place”.
425.
Mr Chilcott
replied that he could not produce a “serious paper” with the
specific
detail
requested:
“To offer
advice on where to build big infrastructure projects … requires a
lot more
knowledge
than we have in the IPU about local conditions … and some sense
of
an overall
development plan for Iraq – something the World Bank will
presumably
draw up
once they have got themselves engaged. These judgements will have
to
be carefully
considered by development experts.
“In my
view, the two most important things the PM should raise with the
President
now are (a)
security and (b) the functioning of the CPA. Until these are
solved, there
is little
chance of any infrastructure work making much
impact.”240
426.
Baroness Amos
saw Mr Blair’s direction as an opportunity for a
substantive
reassessment
of DFID’s engagement on reconstruction in Iraq.
427.
Baroness Amos
gave Mr Benn and Mr Chakrabarti a read out from
Mr Blair’s
3 June
meeting later that day.241
She
reported that Mr Blair had made a number of
specific
proposals:
•
There was a
lack of administrative capacity in the CPA. The UK should
increase
its support
for it.
239
Email
Rycroft to Chilcott, 4 June 2003, ‘Draft Paper for the
PM’.
240
Email
Chilcott to Rycroft, 4 June 2003, ‘Draft Paper for
PM’.
241
Minute
Bewes to DFID [junior official], 3 June 2003, ‘PM Iraq
Meeting’.
77