10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
Iraq.101
The
question about what sort of resolution was needed for the
administration
and reconstruction
of Iraq should be parked. Mr Blair said:
“The time
to debate this would come when we had secured victory, and
were
in a position
of strength.”
175.
Mr Blair
raised Phase IV issues with President Bush the next day.
They
discussed
the need to push for a quick agreement on the resolution to
continue the
OFF
programme, and for a separate resolution that would free up
financial and troop
contributions
from other nations, secure World Bank and IMF involvement and
put
reconstruction
on the right footing.102
176.
Mr Rycroft
recorded that Mr Blair had identified the main issue as being
whether
the UN
formed the future Iraqi government or whether the Coalition did so
with UN
endorsement,
but that he had said “it was not helpful to expose this distinction
yet”.
177.
On 31 March,
Mr Llewellyn advised Mr Dominick Chilcott, Head of the
IPU, that UK
military
lawyers based in Kuwait were becoming alarmed at ORHA’s
activities.103
ORHA
had issued
three orders in relation to the port of Umm Qasr, including the
application of
US labour
and customs laws, for which there was no clear legal authority. The
position
of UK
forces, if asked to participate in related activities, was
therefore uncertain.
178.
Mr Llewellyn
concluded: “If it cannot be sorted out, we may well need a
decision
from
Ministers about whether UK forces should decline to take part in
actions that we
consider
unauthorised or unlawful.”
179.
The IPU sent
recommendations on the UK’s future engagement with ORHA
to
180.
The IPU
advised that the UK objective of an IIA acting under UN
authorisation
was
unlikely to be in place sooner than 90 days after the end of
hostilities.105
Until
then,
mechanisms
were needed to deliver humanitarian assistance and, within the
relevant
legal
constraints, civil administration. Without such mechanisms, those
tasks would fall
on the
military, which had other priorities and limited
resources.
181.
The IPU listed
three options:
•
tasking and
resourcing 1 (UK) Div to take on those tasks autonomously in
areas
of Iraq for
which it was responsible;
101
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 28 March 2003, Prime Minister’s Meeting with
President Bush at Camp
David:
Dinner on 26 March’.
102
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 27 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
President Bush at Camp
David: Iraq
Phase IV’.
103
Minute
Llewellyn to Chilcott, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA: Current
Activity’.
104
Minute Iraq
Planning Unit to Private Secretary [FCO], 1 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
ORHA’.
105
Paper IPU,
28 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA)’.
33