4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
291.
The No.10
record stated that Mr Blair had made clear to both Dr Blix
and
Dr ElBaradei
“the importance of putting Iraqis on the spot with some sharp
questions,
to show
whether they were co-operating fully or not”. He had “also
emphasised the
importance
of interviews”.
292.
The wider
issues discussed are addressed in Section 3.7.
293.
Mr Straw
set out a detailed case for confronting the challenge posed by
Iraq
in a speech
to the International Institute for Strategic Studies on 11
February.
294.
In a speech
made at the International Institute for Strategic Studies on 11
February,
Mr Straw
set out “the disturbing outcome of a failure to act decisively to
secure Iraq’s
disarmament”
and the need, “for the sake of the Iraqi people, long-term
stability in the
Middle
East, the credibility of the UN and the cause of international law
and collective
security”
to confront the challenge posed by Iraq.115
295.
In relation to
Iraq, Mr Straw stated:
“Weapons of
mass destruction have been a central pillar of Saddam’s
dictatorship
since the
1980s. He has amassed poisons and viruses both to suppress his
own
people, and
to threaten his neighbours. He has relentlessly pursued his
ultimate
ambition,
the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability, in flagrant
disregard
of SCRs and
Iraq’s obligations as a non-nuclear weapons state under
the
Non‑Proliferation
Treaty. His pursuit of these weapons has lain at the heart of
the
UN’s
stand-off with Iraq for the past 12 years.”
296.
Mr Straw
argued that the Iraqi threat to Europe and the US was not
“overstated”.
Resolution
1441 recognised the “singular menace” from Iraq’s weapons of
mass
destruction.
UNSCOM had had some successes, including overseeing the
destruction
of
“significant quantities” of weaponry, but when the inspectors left
in 1998, it was
“clear that
the regime continued to hold vast stocks of deadly weaponry”.
The
absence of
inspectors since 1998 had “allowed Saddam to accelerate his
weapons
programmes”.
The report published in autumn 2002 had “demonstrated
determined
efforts” to
enhance Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities. Dr
Blix’s report
to the
Security Council in January had “underlined these concerns”.
Diplomacy,
intelligence
co-operation, reinforced export controls, and interdiction and
disruption of
supplies
were options being used to “frustrate the ambitions” of other
regimes. But “in
respect of
Iraq”, those options had been “exhausted … over 12 long years”. It
was the
“deadly
combination of capability and intent” which made Saddam Hussein
“uniquely
dangerous”.
Rogue regimes which showed “total disregard for the rule of law,
and
share the
terrorists’ hatred of our values” were the “most likely source of
materials and
know-how”.
Given Saddam Hussein’s “longstanding support for terrorist causes”,
the
115
The
National Archives, 11 February 2003, Iraq: A
challenge we must confront.
347