8 | The
invasion
615.
Mr Hoon
agreed Lt Gen Reith’s recommendation to take the whole of
Maysan
province
into the UK AO once al-Amara was secure.360
616.
Mr Hoon
also noted the US request to Adm Boyce for the UK to take
responsibility
for Basra
and Maysan provinces during Phase IV. Mr Hoon expected to
discuss the UK’s
Phase IV
AOR with Secretary Rumsfeld on 15 April.
617.
Mr Watkins
informed Mr Lee that Mr Hoon wanted an initial discussion
of the
US request
“to head up a division” during Phase IV on the morning of 14 April,
before
Secretary
Rumsfeld’s call.361
Mr Watkins
wrote:
“This [US]
approach is not, of course, entirely unexpected and Mr Hoon
will wish to
give an
encouraging – if not necessarily definitive – response. It would
therefore be
helpful if
the following preparatory work could be set in hand:
•
Informal
soundings of the US over the weekend on the likely nature of
the
request (ie
when, for how long, where?) and how it fits with wider US
thinking
(total
number of divisions?).
•
Initial
assumptions on the extent of likely contributions from other
countries to
a UK-led
division.
•
Initial
assessment of the feasibility of the task and its implications for
other
commitments.
•
Any
conditions (or counter-requests) that we should attach to our
taking on
this task.
(As with the ISAF in Kabul, presumably we would want
assurances
of …
support from the US.)”
618.
Dr Simon
Cholerton, Acting Head of the MOD Iraq Secretariat, replied
on
13 April.362
He advised
that:
“US
thinking … on when, how long and where remains immature. But we
expect a
six-month
period, beginning in the summer, will be the focus, with the UK AOR
…
in SE Iraq.
The US are looking for the UK to head a division operating around
four
provinces,
with UK forces covering two provinces and the remainder being dealt
with
[by]
Coalition partners …
“UK
thinking … The current working assumption is that we should scale
down
our
contribution to a division HQ and a brigade, as soon as this is
feasible, but by
September.
This could then be maintained until spring 2004. Work is in hand
now to
scope our
potential contribution until spring 2005. But the question is not
simply one
of what
force levels are available, but what tasks those forces are
expected to carry
out. This
requires further work. It may, for example, be possible to
establish a model
based on
gendarmerie security forces, confining the military to more
specialist areas
360
Minute
Watkins to CJO, 12 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Expansion of the UK
AOR’.
361
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 12 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase
IV’.
362
Minute
Cholerton to PS/SofS [MOD], 13 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV
Coalition’.
109