The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
which
terrorism is used. But intelligence on Iraq’s capabilities and
intentions in this
field is
limited.”
395.
The Key
Judgements of the JIC Assessment of 10 October were:
“•
Saddam’s
capability to conduct effective terrorist attacks is very
limited,
especially
outside the Gulf region.
•
But Iraq
will aim to conduct terrorist attacks against Coalition interests
and Israel
during a
military campaign. Terrorism could be attempted against
Coalition
forces and
Gulf States supporting them during a military build‑up if
Saddam
believes an
attack is inevitable.
•
Saddam will
seek to conduct terrorist attacks against UK interests abroad in
the
event of
military action against him. Iraqi attacks within the UK are
unlikely.
•
No major
terrorist group will conduct attacks on behalf of Iraq. But Al
Qaida and
other
Islamic extremists may initiate attacks in response to Coalition
military
action. Al
Qaida will use an attack on Iraq as further ‘justification’ for
terrorist
attacks
against Western or Israeli interests.
•
Iraq’s
terrorism capability is inadequate to carry out chemical or
biological
attacks
beyond individual assassination attempts using poisons. But Al
Qaida
or other
terrorist groups could acquire a chemical/biological capability
from the
dispersal
of Iraqi material or expertise during a conflict in Iraq or
following the
collapse of
Saddam’s regime.”
396.
The Assessment
stated that during the 1991 Gulf Conflict, Iraq had “sought
(with
negligible
success) to conduct terrorist attacks against Coalition interests”
and that
Saddam
Hussein’s “overriding objective” was to “avoid a US attack that
would threaten
his
regime”.
397.
In the event
of US‑led military action against Iraq, the JIC judged that
Saddam
Hussein
would:
“… aim to
use terrorism or the threat of it. Fearing the US response, he is
likely to
weigh the
costs and benefits carefully in deciding the timing and
circumstances in
which
terrorism is used. But intelligence on Iraq’s capabilities and
intentions in this
field is
limited.”
398.
Other key
points in the Assessment are set out in the Box below.
Iraq’s
capabilities and intentions
The
Assessment stated that:
•
Diplomatic and
economic restrictions since 1991 had “severely
degraded
Baghdad’s
already limited overseas terrorism capability”.
268