The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
723.
France,
Germany and Russia responded by tabling a memorandum
which
proposed
strengthening inspections and bringing forward the work
programme
specified
in resolution 1284 and accelerating its timetable.
724.
France,
Germany and Russia responded to the draft resolution by tabling
a
memorandum,
building on the earlier tripartite declaration of 10 February,
stating that
“full and
effective disarmament” remained “the imperative objective of the
international
community”.215
That
“should be achieved peacefully through the inspection
regime”.
The “conditions
for using force” had “not been fulfilled”. The memorandum stated
that
the
Security Council “must step up its efforts to give a real chance to
the peaceful
settlement
of the crisis”. A “combination of a clear programme of action,
reinforced
inspections,
a clear timeline and the military build-up” provided “a realistic
means
to unite
the Security Council and to exert maximum pressure on
Iraq”.
725.
Canada also
circulated ideas for a process based on key tasks
identified
by UNMOVIC.
726.
In a
“non-paper” circulated on 24 February, Canada set out its ideas
on
establishing
“a defined process for a specific period of time to address
the
727.
The document
stated that the Security Council divisions on Iraq “could
have
serious
long-term implications for the UN and for international peace and
stability”;
and that
both sides of the division had a point:
“•
An
open-ended inspection process would relieve the pressure on the
Iraqis
to disarm.
•
A truncated
process would leave doubt that war was a last resort.”
728.
Canada
suggested that the inspectors should bring forward their
“clusters”
document
“early” on 28 February and provide the Council with a prioritised
list
of key substantive
tasks for Iraq to accomplish. The inspectors would then
provide
four,
weekly, reports on the substance with a final report on 28
March for discussion
at a Ministerial-level
meeting of the Security Council on 31 March.
729.
If the 28
March report indicated that Iraq had not complied, “all necessary
means
could be
used to force them to disarm”. If Iraq co-operated “an enhanced
inspection,
verification
and monitoring system would be implemented”.
730.
Mr Rycroft
commented to Mr Blair on 26 February that the paper was
“unhelpful”.
215
UN Security
Council, 24 February 2003, ‘Letter dated 24 February 2003 from the
Permanent
Representatives
of France, Germany and the Russian Federation to the United Nations
addressed to the
President
of the Security Council’ (S/2003/214).
216
Letter
Wright to Colleagues, 24 February 2003, [untitled], attaching
‘Non-paper: Ideas on Bridging
the Divide’.
308