The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Inspections
The JIC had
“judged in October” that:
“Saddam was
confident he could prevent UNMOVIC from finding any
evidence
before
military options started to close off … and that concealment and
dispersal
of
sensitive items were the basis of Iraq’s strategy. […] But by
mid-January there
were signs
that Iraq was coming under pressure from UNMOVIC finds that
were
inconsistent
with its December 2002 declaration. […]
“[…]
Intelligence is unclear, but it is possible the UNMOVIC discoveries
have
increased
Iraqi uncertainty. Blix’s tough statement to the Security Council
on
27 January
surprised Baghdad and may have increased the regime’s concerns
about
UNMOVIC.
Saddam Hussein continues to believe that the possession of WMD is
a
vital Iraqi
interest. […] Any WMD admission would therefore be tactical rather
than
indicative
of a genuine change of policy.”
Iraqi
military preparations
•
Saddam Hussein
would have “little incentive to launch such a strike while
the
Iraqi
strategy focuses on convincing UNMOVIC that Iraq does not have
WMD
holdings”,
but it might “become an attractive option in the face of
imminent
Coalition
military action”.
•
A “pre-emptive
limited artillery strike on Kuwait using CBW could be
launched
in as
little as two hours”.
Saddam’s
mindset
•
Saddam Hussein
was “under increasing pressure” as the inspections
regime
intensified,
UNMOVIC had made “significant discoveries” and the
Coalition
military
build-up continued.
•
The JIC judged
that Saddam Hussein had “underestimated UNMOVIC’s
capability
to expose
his deception”. He had “failed to realise that he was facing a
situation
different
from the days of UNSCOM”. UNMOVIC’s “limited success”
highlighted
the “risks
Saddam took in providing a weak declaration of Iraq’s
WMD-holdings”.
•
“In the face
of an attack, or even before hostilities if he judged that an
attack was
imminent,”
Saddam Hussein might take a number of actions,
including:
– making a
last minute declaration of his WMD;
…
–
inflicting “high enough casualties on any Coalition ground forces,
perhaps
in Kuwait,
including through use of CBW, to halt a Coalition attack and
to
swing
public opinion in the West against hostilities”.
•
“Once
hostilities were underway”, Saddam Hussein might also:
– “… seek
to cause an international outcry over the level of Iraqi or
Coalition
casualties”;
and
– “pursue a
scorched earth policy, including the destruction of oil wells
and
poisoning
the water supply”.
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