6.5 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003

129. Mr Bowen emphasised that those objectives covering the period between the end

of hostilities and the establishment of a new Iraqi government needed a lot of work:

“… these would need to go a lot wider in terms of civil administration (involving the

UN) and a process for arriving at representative government. Much of this latter area

is nowhere near agreed between the US and the UK …

“It will be important before the Coalition embarks on military action to ensure that we

share the same military objectives with the US, otherwise the strategic direction of

the campaign risks falling apart …”70

130. Mr Bowen sent a further revision of the military campaign objectives, incorporating

comments from Mr Straw and Whitehall departments, to Sir David Manning on

11 February.

131. In late January, Mr Blair suggested to President Bush that delaying military

action by one month would provide additional time to work up more coherent

post-conflict plans.

132. Mr Blair sent President Bush a Note on 24 January, in which he wrote that the

biggest risk they faced was internecine fighting in Iraq when a military strike destabilised

the regime.71

133. Mr Blair also listed a number of potential advantages in delaying military action by

one month to late March/early April, including the additional time that would allow for

working up more coherent post-conflict plans.

134. Sir David Manning told the Inquiry that delay would have opened “all sorts

of possibilities”, including an awareness of the risks being run by setting up ORHA

very late.72

135. Ms Short commented that, given the lack of preparedness, she expected the date

to be put back: “I wouldn’t have believed we would go that quickly, given how unready

everything was.”73

136. FCO briefing for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush on 31 January

advised Mr Blair to make two points: that “the US needs to pay much more

attention, quickly, to planning on ‘day after’ issues; and that the UN needs

to be central to it”.

70 Minute Bowen to Manning, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’ attaching

Paper [unattributed and undated], ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’.

71 Letter Manning to Rice, 24 January 2003, [untitled] attaching Note Blair.

72 Public hearing, 30 November 2009, page 85.

73 Public hearing, 2 February 2010, page 64.

333