The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

106.  Mr Benn was also advised that there had been a “breakthrough” in the relationship

between the PCO and DFID in the South, with the PCO accepting and welcoming

the Technical Advisory Team (TAT). After many delays, the PCO had begun work

in the South.

107.  Following talks in London, DFID was also seeking to work more closely with

MND(SE), to “synchronise” UK reconstruction and security efforts. MND(SE) was

“struggling” to disburse its QIPs and CERPs funds (totalling US$25m), largely because

of a lack of capacity. The TAT might be able to assist. A DFID team would visit Basra to

continue discussions.

108.  The 14 October meeting of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq was briefed that

the US military was planning military action in Fallujah.55

109.  The Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq agreed that an operation to clear Fallujah

was right in principle but the UK should try to persuade the US to give Prime Minister

Allawi time to improve the political environment.

110.  Mr Chaplin reported by telegram on the same day that the US planned to spend

US$3.4bn on “rapid reconstruction” in 18 “strategic cities” (defined as major population

or religious centres and real or potential areas of insurgency) in the run-up to the

Iraqi elections, including US$1.4bn in Baghdad and US$316m in Basra.56 The US had

allocated US$75m for Fallujah, but all work there was currently suspended. The initiative

covered PCO, USAID and CERPs projects.

111.  Mr Chaplin’s report prompted Mr Blair to request an update on developments in

Najaf.57 Mr Quarrey directed that request to the Cabinet Office.58

112.  Sir Nigel Sheinwald and Dr Rice discussed Iraq on 22 October.59 Sir Nigel reported

that they had agreed that not enough was being done in towns where the IIG had

regained control from insurgents. Dr Rice had said that she had (again) asked the NSC

to find out why reconstruction funding was moving so slowly.

113.  Mr Blair discussed progress on reconstruction, especially in key cities after military

action, with Prime Minister Allawi by telephone on the same day.60 Prime Minister Allawi

said that effective reconstruction would have a positive impact on the security situation.

Mr Blair agreed and said he would mention it to President Bush. Mr Quarrey’s record of

the conversation was copied to Mr Benn’s Principal Private Secretary.

55  Record, 14 October 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq meeting.

56  Telegram 280 Baghdad to FCO London, 14 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction Projects in

Strategic Cities’.

57  Letter Quarrey to MOD [junior official], 18 October 2004, ‘Iraq’.

58  Letter Quarrey to MOD [junior official], 18 October 2004, ‘Iraq’.

59  Letter Sheinwald to Adams, 22 October 2004, ‘Conversation with US National Security Adviser,

Friday 22 October’.

60  Letter Quarrey to Wilson, 22 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Allawi, 22 October’.

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