9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
problems …
and the remaining flaws in the leadership of the Iraqi Security
Forces.
They have
not yet agreed the note with other government
departments.”299
584.
At DOP on 14
February, Ministers accepted the recommendation to retain
five
battlegroups
(around 5,200 troops) in Basra until the end of August 2007, which
would
allow the
UK to retain a presence at Basra Palace.300
Ministers
would review that
presence in
the summer in the light of conditions in Basra and any residual US
concerns
about the
speed of withdrawal.
585.
DOP agreed
that Mr Blair should announce the UK’s decision to re‑posture
forces
within
MND(SE) to Parliament when it returned from Recess, in the week
beginning
26 February.
586.
In discussion,
the point was made that it was not clear whether US concerns
would
have
reduced sufficiently by the end of August to allow Basra Palace to
be handed over
as
planned.
587.
Mr Browne
told the Inquiry that he was “not conscious that there were things
we
did not or
could not do, particularly in Basra or in Iraq, because we had
troops deployed
to
Afghanistan”.301
He
recollected that there was a long term strategy to reduce
troop
numbers in
Iraq that was “fixed in any event and was not related to the fact
that we were
deploying
troops into Afghanistan”. At every stage, Mr Browne added that
he had taken
and
accepted the advice of the military.
588.
VAdm Style
advised the Chiefs of Staff on 14 February of “the very real sense
from
US
interlocutors, notwithstanding the likely lack of a roll‑over of
UNSCR 1723, that there
was a need
to plan for an extension of the current US ‘surge’ of forces to Feb
08 …”302
589.
Maj Gen Shaw
reported on 15 February that Gen Petraeus – who was
visiting
MND(SE) –
was “largely receptive” to the UK’s proposed approach but
had:
“…
challenged the assumption that this UNSCR [authorising MNF presence
in
Iraq] will
be the last; he suggested a growing appetite, both US and
Iraqi/Maliki,
for another
one … This threatens our assumptions about PIC this year across
Iraq
which
drives the risk‑taking, time‑driven approach we have adopted. This
requires
political
engagement at the highest level, because the answer to this
question sets
the context
for all our military activity and planning.”303
299
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior officials] to Prime Minister, 14 February
2007, ‘DOP 14 February –
Op SINBAD
Assessment’.
300
Minutes, 14
February 2007, DOP meeting.
301
Public
hearing, 25 January 2010, page 26.
302
Minutes, 14
February 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
303
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 15 February 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq update – 15
February 2007’.
109