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12.1  |  Security Sector Reform
1088.  The Embassy reported that “Maliki is frustrated at what he feels is his lack of
control over Iraqi security” but also that Gen Casey feared that “forcing the pace risks
putting too much pressure on immature Iraqi systems and capabilities”.
Iraqi Security Force assessments in late 2006
1089.  Lt Gen Fry submitted his End of Tour Report on 28 August.1010 He wrote:
“The key indices of the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are regularly
reported and show steady progress. There are some structural problems which, in
the IA, will require an additional 52,000 soldiers to be trained, and in the IPS, will
require the process of internal reform to be seen through. But these are regarded
as running repairs to structures which are fundamentally sound in design and
institutionally well‑conceived. Given this positive background, the successive IA
battalions which have disintegrated when placed under orders or actually deployed
to operations outside their divisional area is disappointing. Disappointing, but
probably not surprising. The month on month increase of numbers trained conceals
organisations which remain very immature … Seen from MNSTC‑I, this is entirely
predictable at the 18 month point of a three year process and [Lieutenant General]
Dempsey [Commander MNSTC‑I] would assert that the ISF project is on track, so
long as too much is not asked of it too soon …”
1090.  Lt Gen Fry thought that the ISF would be tested over the next month. If they were
successful he judged:
“… the campaign will have negotiated a tricky period … But the stakes are high
and failure would have implications for campaign progress, the place of the ISF in
Iraqi society and the authority of the Maliki government. It is difficult to predict the
outcome …”
1091.  On 15 November, the JIC assessed:
“MNF operations under the Baghdad security plan have had only temporary and
local impacts: violence has been displaced and has increased overall. The ISF have
been unable to sustain any improvements. Operations have exposed the patchy
nature of Iraqi Army capability and the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi police. Prime
Minister Maliki is attempting to address some of the problems: diplomatic reporting
indicates he has ordered a purge of officers within the security Ministries involved in
sectarian violence. The MOI claims that 3,000 police have been relieved of duty –
although most are likely to be re‑deployed elsewhere.”1011
1010  Minute Fry to PSO/CDS, 28 August 2006, ‘SBMR‑I End of Tour Report’.
1011  JIC Assessment, 15 November 2006, ‘Iraq: Risk of Deepening Sectarian Division’.
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