12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1088.
The Embassy
reported that “Maliki is frustrated at what he feels is his lack
of
control
over Iraqi security” but also that Gen Casey feared that
“forcing the pace risks
putting too
much pressure on immature Iraqi systems and
capabilities”.
1089.
Lt
Gen Fry submitted his End of Tour Report on 28
August.1010
He
wrote:
“The key
indices of the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are
regularly
reported
and show steady progress. There are some structural problems which,
in
the IA,
will require an additional 52,000 soldiers to be trained, and in
the IPS, will
require the
process of internal reform to be seen through. But these are
regarded
as running
repairs to structures which are fundamentally sound in design
and
institutionally
well‑conceived. Given this positive background, the successive
IA
battalions
which have disintegrated when placed under orders or actually
deployed
to
operations outside their divisional area is disappointing.
Disappointing, but
probably
not surprising. The month on month increase of numbers trained
conceals
organisations
which remain very immature … Seen from MNSTC‑I, this is
entirely
predictable
at the 18 month point of a three year process and [Lieutenant
General]
Dempsey
[Commander MNSTC‑I] would assert that the ISF project is on track,
so
long as too
much is not asked of it too soon …”
1090.
Lt
Gen Fry thought that the ISF would be tested over the next
month. If they were
successful
he judged:
“… the
campaign will have negotiated a tricky period … But the stakes are
high
and failure
would have implications for campaign progress, the place of the ISF
in
Iraqi
society and the authority of the Maliki government. It is difficult
to predict the
outcome
…”
1091.
On 15
November, the JIC assessed:
“MNF
operations under the Baghdad security plan have had only temporary
and
local
impacts: violence has been displaced and has increased overall. The
ISF have
been unable
to sustain any improvements. Operations have exposed the
patchy
nature of
Iraqi Army capability and the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi police.
Prime
Minister
Maliki is attempting to address some of the problems: diplomatic
reporting
indicates
he has ordered a purge of officers within the security Ministries
involved in
sectarian
violence. The MOI claims that 3,000 police have been relieved of
duty –
although
most are likely to be re‑deployed elsewhere.”1011
1010
Minute Fry
to PSO/CDS, 28 August 2006, ‘SBMR‑I End of Tour
Report’.
1011
JIC
Assessment, 15 November 2006, ‘Iraq: Risk of Deepening Sectarian
Division’.
307