3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
indicate
that Iraq has no intention of full co‑operation … We need to
encourage
UNMOVIC to
keep careful data to establish whether there is a pattern of
Iraqi
behaviour
indicating they have no intention of complying”.
•
It would be
important to keep the Security Council united, but that
would
“not be easy”.
266.
Cabinet on 12
December was told that the Security Council had decided that
Iraq’s
declaration
had to be scrutinised before it was made available to a wider
audience to
ensure that
particularly sensitive information had been
excised.84
An initial
discussion
of the
declaration was expected the following week.
267.
Mr Peter
Gooderham, Political Counsellor in the British Embassy
Washington,
reported on
12 December that a US official had told him that he expected the
US
Administration
to decide “probably sometime in mid‑January, to lay it on the line
that Iraq
had ‘one
last chance’ to co‑operate”.85
This would
be accompanied by “an increasingly
overt
military build up from early January”. Additional measures for
putting pressure
on Saddam
Hussein were also being considered. The US Administration was
also
considering
a public presentation of the evidence against Iraq.
268.
The letter was
seen by Sir David Manning.86
269.
Mr Julian
Miller, Chief of the Assessments Staff, advised Sir David
Manning on
13 December
that the Iraqi declaration was “largely based on material already
presented
to the
UN”, and that:
“There
appears to have been no attempt to answer any of the unresolved
questions
highlighted
by UNSCOM or refute any of the points made in the UK or
US
270.
The absence of
new material was described as “striking, particularly in
relation
to the
biological weapons programme, where UNSCOM have described previous
Iraqi
FFCDs as
deficient in all areas”. The DIS had also clarified that Iraq had
“only previously
admitted to
testing VX in aerial munitions, not to any other
weaponisation”.
271.
A JIC
Assessment issued on 13 December warned that any US‑led
action
against
Iraq and a subsequent occupation was one of many issues that
could
draw large
numbers to Islamist extremist ideology over the next five
years.
272.
The Assessment
is addressed in the Box below.
84
Cabinet
Conclusions, 12 December 2002.
85
Letter
Gooderham to Oakden, 12 December 2002, ‘Iraq: How Imminent is
War?’
86
Manuscript
comment Manning, 17 December 2002, on Letter Gooderham to
Oakden,
12 December
2002, ‘Iraq: How Imminent is War?’
87
Minute
Miller to Manning, 13 December 2002, ‘Iraq: WMD
Declaration’.
49