The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The
arrangements for dealing with Iraqi oil revenue which the US
proposed
should be
used for meeting the costs of their administration of Iraq as well
as
for reconstruction.
The UK feared this would provoke criticism for reneging
on
the promise
to use oil revenues exclusively for the benefit of
Iraq.
•
The role of
the UN Special Co-ordinator, which the UK believed should
not
be limited
to co-ordination.
41.
The brief
explained that there was a need for “more realism about what the
Security
Council
would be willing to approve and what the Iraqis’ reaction is likely
to be”.
42.
The IPU set
out a number of “propositions” which it hoped Mr Blair and
President
Bush would
agree, including:
“(a) … we
should not attempt retrospective UNSC authorisation of our
military
action
…
(b) … We
can’t expect the Security Council to accept overt US/UK control of
the
civilian
administration …
(c) As
quickly as possible, we should aim to set up an Iraqi interim
authority with
genuine
executive powers, not subordinate to the Coalition …
(d) How we
establish the IIA … will be crucial … our role should be behind
the
scenes with
the UN visibly out in front …
(e) The UN
or the Iraqis, not the Coalition, should manage oil
revenues.
(f) We
should encourage Kofi Annan to appoint a UN Special Co-ordinator
who
would play
an important role in facilitating the emergence of the Iraqi
interim
authority
and in supervising, with a light touch, its
decisions.”
43.
On 26 March,
Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, wrote to Mr Blair with
advice
he had
requested at the Ad Hoc Meeting the previous day.20
It
covered:
“… the need
for UN Security Council authorisation for the Coalition or
the
international
community to establish an interim Iraqi administration to reform
and
restructure
Iraq and its administration.”
44.
Lord
Goldsmith’s view was that:
“… a
further Security Council resolution is needed to authorise imposing
reform
and
restructuring of Iraq and its Government. In the absence of a
further resolution,
the UK (and
US) would be bound by the provisions of international law
governing
belligerent
Occupation … the general principle is that an Occupying Power
does
not become
the government of the occupied territory. Rather, it exercises
temporary
de facto
control …”
20
Minute
Attorney General to Prime Minister, 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Authorisation for an Interim
Administration’.
138