The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
got copies
of the not yet declassified draft, presumably through the American
and
British
members of our College [of Commissioners].
“The German
and French foreign ministers, who had been eager to make
use
of the
document but did not have such a channel of quick provision … could
not
make use of
it to show what concrete benchmarks might look like. Their US
and
UK
colleagues, by contrast, were therefore able to make extensive and
preemptive
use of the
draft to show how unreliable Iraqi declarations and conduct had
been in
the past.”
1167.
Dr Blix
added that Mr John Wolf, the US Commissioner, had been
critical of the
relevance
of the draft “clusters” document, which provided “only a readable
historical
account
testifying to Iraq’s deception” and had only a few pages on what
had happened
after 1998.
The US was interested in whether Iraq had taken “a strategic
decision”,
and that
“was all that mattered”. The US “did not afford the smallest window
to the
benchmark
approach that Washington saw London working on”. The US “disdain”
had
“shocked
and surprised the other members of the College”.
1168.
President
Putin told Mr Blair on 7 March that Russia would
oppose
military action.
1169.
Following the
discussions with Mr Ivanov on 4 and 5 March and the
observation
in
Mr Brenton’s telegram of 6 March, that the Americans were
sanguine about avoiding
a Russian
veto, Sir Roderic Lyne wrote to Mr Ricketts on 6 March with
advice, including
for
Mr Blair’s planned telephone conversation with President
Putin.351
The letter
was
copied to
Sir David Manning.
1170.
Sir Roderic
wrote that he was “less sanguine” about avoiding a Russian
veto
unless the
French position changed. Mr Ivanov’s aim was to help deny nine
positive
votes for
the resolution and thereby avoid the need to take a definitive
decision. He
would have
reported to President Putin that the UK was not totally confident
of success
and was
looking at concessions over language.
1171.
Sir Roderic
suggested that when Mr Blair spoke to President Putin, he
should
repeat and
reinforce the message that he had given to Mr Ivanov, and
argue that the
issue was
about two fundamental questions of principle:
•
The need to
deal with the problem of proliferation. That was: “big … and
…
getting
worse … The international community had let this drift … We have
to
work
together on this. We can’t go around attacking everyone; but if
Iraq gets
away with
it, it’s open house for everyone … we’ve got to send the
message
351
Letter Lyne
to Ricketts, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq/Russia: Ivanov’s Visit, the End
Game, and the Prime
Minister’s
Call to Putin this Evening’.
392