The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1067.
Gen Granville‑Chapman
visited Iraq and Afghanistan between 9 and 13 July.560
In Iraq,
he reported that ISTAR and helicopters remained “the key focus” for
equipment.
1068.
In July 2006,
in his post‑operation tour report, Maj Gen Cooper wrote
that,
in relation
to the UK’s understanding of militia groupings:
“The
paucity of specialist ISTAR capability is also a concern. In order
to prosecute
routine
operations more effectively and specific strike operations
accurately we need
better or
additional UAV capability, full‑motion video [and] geo‑location
equipment …
capabilities
are available on the market and would be real value for
money.”561
1069.
Major General
Richard Shirreff, the new GOC MND(SE), wrote in his first
report
on 21 July
about two recent “significant operational
successes”.562
He
stated:
“… we have
been lucky not to take more casualties … The message is that
we
cannot rely
on luck and that the critical shortage of key enablers exposes
our
soldiers to
significant risk. Despite the good work done by the Nimrod MR2
and
the two
[Helicopter] Broadsword, we are woefully short of airborne
surveillance
capability.
We are unable to strike with precision from the air, which we
emphatically
need to do,
without attack helicopters or a similar capability.”
1070.
Forwarding the
report to No. 10, Mr Browne’s Private Office wrote that it
raised:
“… a number
of issues that have subsequently been discussed in the
Defence
Secretary’s
weekly Ministerial. Work is in progress to consider these issues
and
further
advice will be provided should any significant changes in approach
be
1071.
On 26 July,
the Chiefs of Staff “noted the immediate requirement for
national
ISTAR
assets that would enable the successful prosecution of detention
operations
1072.
In August,
Gen Granville‑Chapman and Maj Gen Rollo briefed
Mr Browne on
the UK’s
helicopter force.565
1073.
On 11 August,
Mr Browne’s Private Office wrote that he remained
concerned
that the UK
had “a shortfall that needs to be addressed” and requested a
“formal
assessment”
of how some of the options discussed at the meeting could
increase
capability
over the next 12 months.566
560
Minute
Granville‑Chapman to Stirrup, 14 July 2006, ‘VCDS Visit to Iraq and
Afghanistan 9‑13 Jul 06’.
561
Report HQ
MND(SE), 21 July 2006, ‘Progress Report – Operation
TELIC’.
562
Report
Shirreff, 21 July 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq – 21 July
2006’.
563
Note
PS/SofS [MOD] to Phillipson, 26 July 2006, ‘Iraq:
Update’.
564
Minutes, 26
July 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
565
Minute
McNeil to MA/VCDS, 11 August 2006, ‘Shortfall in Helicopters
Capability’.
566
Minute
McNeil to MA/VCDS, 11 August 2006, ‘Shortfall in Helicopters
Capability’.
182