9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
888.
By 1300 on 29
March, the Director of Joint Commitments (DJC) reported
to
Mr Browne’s
Assistant Private Secretary that he considered “little tangible
success has
been
achieved by either side, and sustained conflict looks set to
continue”.437
There
had
been a
24-hour relative lull in activity, possibly due to Friday prayers
and a pause in
ISF operations.
889.
The DJC’s
report said that a Deputy Commanding General of MNC-I, plus
a
Command and
Control cell, planners, analytical support and intelligence
capability had
arrived at
the COB, from which seven US Apache helicopters were also
operating.
More US
forces, including a tactical HQ and an infantry company were on
their way and
US Central
Command had “instructed planning to examine the feasibility of
diverting
additional
US troops to MND(SE) should there be a requirement”.
890.
MND(SE)’s
planning “focused on the requirement for UK military effort to
enhance
the
capacity of the ISF, whilst attempting to provide a ‘Bridging
Concept’ for Basra
from the
current confrontation to the Mohan’s [sic] original,
more-considered Basra
Security
Plan.”
891.
On 29 March,
Mr Prentice reported that, in an emergency meeting of
the
Executive
Steering Committee (ESC) (usually focused on supporting Fardh
al-Qanoon),
Gen Petraeus
described the situation in Basra as “confused and quite
difficult”.438
The
military
objectives that the Iraqi Government had set itself were more
expansive than the
MNF had
expected and Gen Petraeus warned that they “would not be able to
achieve
their wider
publicly stated objectives of gaining total control of
Basra”.
892.
Mr Prentice
reported that Ambassador Crocker had described Basra to the
ESC
as critical
for the Iraqi Government and for the future of Iraq: it was
important that all
Iraqis came
together. He also raised the idea of an “economic initiative for
Basra”. The
proposal,
as Mr Prentice understood it, was less of an economic
initiative and more a
disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration exercise. Mr Prentice
reported that DFID
had some
concerns about the proposals and he could not see how it would be
feasible
in the
absence of a political settlement in Basra. He
commented:
“If the
idea becomes unstoppable, some obvious challenges to implementing
it
successfully
will be:
•
ensuring
Basra has the capacity to manage this level of resources
…
•
managing
the fiduciary risk, and trying to ensure the scheme achieves
long
term impact
and sustainability;
•
ensuring
that the initiative adheres to the ‘do no harm’
principle,
safeguarding
the advances made in provincial authority planning and
delivery
capacity.”
437
Minute DJC
to SofS/APS4 [MOD], 29 March 2008, ‘Basra: MOD
update’.
438
eGram
11998/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 30 March 2008, ‘Iraq: Emergency
Meeting of Executive
Steering
Committee (ESC), 29 March’.
345