3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
496.
Mr Jonathan
Powell marked the telegram to Mr Blair with the
comment
497.
In a minute to
Mr Blair on 16 October, Mr Straw reported discussions
with
Secretary
Powell on 14 and 15 October.172
498.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that he had spoken to Mr Blair on 13
October,
who “had
… favoured a two resolution approach”. He had also told Secretary
Powell:
“… legally
and politically it was almost certain that we would need a
second
resolution
explicitly authorising military action were the UK to be involved
in such
[military]
action against Saddam.”
499.
Mr Blair
wrote alongside that point: “I don’t accept this in all
circs.”173
500.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell had also discussed the risks of acting
without
international
backing and the problems of the “day after” which would be the
“largest
and most
hazardous exercise in nation‑building”; it would not be as
straightforward
501.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that he felt:
“… with two
resolutions we could close a deal with [President] Chirac, but
otherwise
Chirac
would use every chance he had, of which there would be many, to
stift [sic]
both us and
the US. And right now, the French had the votes and we did
not.”
502.
As he had
agreed with Mr Blair, Mr Straw also set out the arguments
for two
resolutions,
including:
•
“In the
real world, there was bound to be a further discussion in the
S[ecurity]
C[ouncil]
if there was any non‑compliance by the Iraqis, and (since we did
not
control the
agenda) a second resolution. On this … the only question was
who
took the
initiative – us (US/UK) or others.”
•
He
“accepted that Blix could not determine whether the US could go to
war but
we were all
bound to rely on Blix’s reports as to the facts about
non‑compliance,
on which
the US and others would then make their own
judgements”.
503.
In relation to
the political environment in the UK, Mr Straw had told
Secretary
Powell that
he was:
“… as
certain as [he] could be that there would be insufficient support
in Cabinet
and the
parliamentary Party to allow us to go to war without clear UN
backing. I was
171
Manuscript
comment Powell to PM on Telegram 544 FCO London to Washington, 16
October 2002,
‘Iraq: My
Conversation with US Secretary of State, 15 October’.
172
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Powell: No US Interlocutors’.
173
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 16 October 2002,
‘Iraq: Conversation with
Powell: No
US Interlocutors’.
174
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Powell: No US Interlocutors’.
289