The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
859.
The Butler
Report recommended that governments in the future should
make
arrangements
to avoid putting the JIC and its Chair into an area of public
controversy
and offered
suggestions as to how that might be achieved.453
“… we
conclude that if intelligence is to be used more widely … in
public
debate in
future, those doing so must be careful to avoid its uses
and
limitations.
It will be essential too, that clearer and more effective
dividing
lines
between assessment and advocacy are established when doing
so.”454
861.
The Government
accepted the Committee’s conclusions on the public use
of
intelligence
in its immediate response to the report and subsequently stated
that:
“Any future
presentation of intelligence will separate the Government case from
the
862.
From late
February 2002, the UK Government position was that Iraq was
a
threat that
had to be dealt with; that Iraq needed to disarm in accordance with
the
obligations
imposed by the UN; and that it was important to agree to the return
of
UN
inspectors to Iraq.
863.
The urgency
and certainty with which the position was stated
reflected
both the
ingrained belief – that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained
chemical
and
biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if
possible
enhance its
capabilities, including at some point in the future a nuclear
capability,
and was
pursuing an active policy of deception and concealment – and the
wider
context in
which the policy was being discussed with the US.
864.
But it also
served to fuel the demand that the Government should publish
the
document it
was known to have prepared, setting out the reasons why it was
so
concerned
about Iraq.
865.
In the
spring and summer of 2002, senior officials and Ministers took
the
view that
the Iraq dossier should not be published until the way ahead on
the
policy was
clearer.
866.
By late
August 2002, the Government was troubled by intense
speculation
about
whether a decision had already been taken to use military force.
In
453
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
467.
454
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
467.
455
Cabinet
Office, Review on
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implementation of
its
Conclusions, March
2005, Cm6492, paragraph 13.
280