The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
209.
The Defence
Intelligence Staff (DIS) produced a more detailed paper on
tribal
dynamics in
Iraq and the UK AOR for the Chiefs of Staff on 11
April.120
210.
The FCO
Research Analysts’ paper on opposition groups distinguished
between
those that
were credible in Iraq and those that had courted US support, with
the two
main
Kurdish groups straddling the divide.121
The UK
needed to balance the views of
“external
oppositionists who have experience of working in free democratic
structures”
with the
need “immediately” to involve those in Iraq.
211.
The third
paper by FCO Research Analysts, on the state of the Iraqi civil
service
and
bureaucracy, described “a very mixed picture”.122
A large
number of able technocrats
had kept
the country going in difficult circumstances, while corruption and
nepotism had
been given
free rein at different levels. The UK had:
“… a fairly
clear idea of how big the civil service is (about 1 million
employees),
how it is
structured and how … employees are paid. We do not have any
deep
knowledge
about which levels of the administration are so highly politicised
as to
need
immediate reform, nor which individuals might have to be retired or
stood
down. This
in any case cannot realistically be assessed until after
liberation.
“Once
Saddam Hussein’s regime has been ousted, it will certainly be
necessary to
remove
those who effectively enabled the regime to stay in power. Others,
even if
members of
the Ba’ath or guilty of minor transgressions, should probably be
left in
place if
possible in order to keep the machinery of the state running.
However, our
(as yet
limited) experience inside Iraq gives the warning that officials
may in any
case
abandon their posts, possibly to seek sanctuary with relatives of
their tribes …
“Iraqis
have reminded us that many competent people now in exile left the
civil
service,
retired early, or were not promoted because they were not
sufficiently
Ba’athist.
They may represent a pool who can be called upon if this can be
done
without
causing resentments or new accusations of nepotism.”
212.
On 8 April,
Mr Rycroft reported the outcome of Mr Blair’s discussions
with
President
Bush at Hillsborough to Mr Straw’s Private
Office.123
Mr Blair
had stressed to
President
Bush the importance of a “joint strategy for the next phase” and of
ensuring
“legitimacy
at every stage”; keeping the UN representative involved would help
to ensure
UN
endorsement.
213.
Mr Blair
emphasised the importance of having the UN involved, in order to
engage
IFIs and
bilateral donors, and to “secure our own exit”.
120
Minute
SECCOS to PSO/CDS, 11 April 2003, ‘OP COS Action: Tribal Factions
in Iraq’, attaching Paper,
[undated],
‘Tribal Dynamics in Iraq’.
121
Paper
Research Analysts, April 2004, ‘Iraqi opposition
groups’.
122
Paper
Research Analysts, 4 April 2003, ‘The state of the Iraqi civil
service and bureaucracy’.
123
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 8 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Bush, 7-8 April’.
40