6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
“The
development of a jointly acceptable approach to Iraqi governance
and
reform in
the Resolution Phase should be pursued with the US. Agreement
on
the role of
the UN is essential.
“A
cross-government view on the area in Iraq for which the UK might
want
to accept
responsibility is required urgently in order to shape or
validate
operational
planning.
“Failure to
ensure political agreement on the territorial integrity of Iraq
could
presage a
break-up that would fix Coalition Forces in long-term
stabilisation
operations.
“We should
encourage the US to begin work now on the future shape of
the
Iraqi armed
forces in order to develop a sound SSR plan in advance of
the
start of
operations. We should also undertake a review of the options
for
rapidly
generating an Iraqi policing capability.
“Early
engagement with OGDs and NGOs is required to scope the
AM
humanitarian
situation and the degree to which it may fall to the
military
to ameliorate
it. We should be prepared in advance for the real
possibility
thatwe may
initially face a task beyond our means to rectify with
little
external support.
“An
assessment of the options for rapidly meeting a surge requirement
for
additional
forces at the start of the AM phase should be undertaken by
PJHQ.
“The UK
should be prepared to commit forces to Iraq at ‘medium scale’ for
at
least six
months following the commencement of the AM phase, and
possibly
out to two
years.”
1010.
The paper
stated that a relatively small number of factors drove UK
engagement.
They
were:
“a.
Governance and reform – What is the UK vision for the future of
Iraq? How
realistic
is the aim of retaining Iraqi territorial integrity? What replaces
the Iraqi
regime and
what role will the UN play? How do we resolve UK/US differences
on
UN
involvement?
b.
Situation – Where will the UK operate and what situation will we
face in that
region?
What is the intent of the various population groups and how
badly
damaged
will the infrastructure be?
c. Iraqi
armed forces – How do we manage the Iraqi armed forces in the short
term
and reform
them in the long term?
d.
Humanitarian situation – What humanitarian situation will be
faced?
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