The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

phase of the war on terrorism.114 He emphasised the US support for the discussion in

the Security Council on more effective and narrowly defined sanctions.

219.  Following discussions with senior US Senators, primarily about developments

in Afghanistan, the British Embassy Washington reported on 29 November that

Mr John Prescott, the Deputy Prime Minister, had been told there was “an overwhelming

majority (80 votes) in the Senate in favour of taking out Saddam Hussein, as a piece

of unfinished business”.115

220.  One Senator suggested that the military had a “very detailed plan”, which he

described as constituting precision bombing and Special Forces’ support for internal

uprisings. He “believed they had the capacity to decapitate Saddam Hussein.

Preparations were well beyond the discussions stage.”

221.  The Senator also suggested that the decision to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan

was “a feint: he [President Bush] had been offered the choice between Afghanistan and

Iraq and had chosen to do the former first”.

222.  Another Senator had set out a strategy of “increased heat”: with strengthened

sanctions, the re-introduction of inspectors, and compiling evidence followed by military

action. That Senator had said that if the UK could not agree with this it should be

weighing in now with the Administration. It would be much more difficult for the US to go

it alone than with the European allies in support. Other countries linked to international

terrorism were not threats of the same order as Iraq.

223.  The Embassy commented that the discussions offered “an interesting insight into

the mood on the Hill”. There was “no reason to believe” that either Senator spoke for the

Administration or had privileged access to Pentagon plans; the military details did “not

square with what we understand of military thinking”.

224.  On 1 December, the British Embassy Washington reported that public speculation

about action against Iraq was moving faster than Administration thinking; and that the

momentum in the debate had shifted in the direction of the hawks.116 A Washington Post

poll of 27 November had found that 78 percent of Americans favoured “having US forces

take military action against Iraq to force Saddam Hussein from power”.

225.  The Embassy reported that, in addition, two new elements had emerged in

comments from the Administration: an increased stress on the need for arms inspectors;

and a clearer identification of WMD with the terrorist threat. The increased emphasis

on weapons inspectors had been seen by some as a step towards military action –

“a Taliban-like deadline”; others might see it as an alternative to unilateral action.

114  The White House, 27 November 2001, Press Briefing.

115  Telegram 1616 Washington to FCO London, 29 November 2001, ‘Deputy Prime Minister’s visit to

Washington: Afghanistan and Iraq’.

116  Telegram 1631 Washington to FCO London, 1 December 2001, ‘The Wider War against Terrorism:

Iraq’.

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