6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
315.
The JIC
Assessment ended by stating that Saddam Hussein still believed he
had
“a chance
of averting military action” or “forcing the Coalition to cease
hostilities” before
his regime
collapsed.
316.
The minutes of
the JIC discussion of the draft Assessment recorded
that:
“… it was
difficult to predict if and when Saddam might launch pre-emptive
strikes,
but the
paper should try and make a judgement on possible timescales. The
trigger
would
probably be set when Saddam concluded that his fate was sealed,
rather
than any
movements by Coalition Forces. Most of the Iraqi military would
probably
crumble
quickly under attack. Saddam would maintain his hold of power until
then,
and there
were no indications of possible coups beforehand. Whilst the Iraqi
public
might
welcome the end of Saddam’s regime, they were also concerned about
the
human costs
of fighting.”112
317.
On 30 January,
Mr Scarlett wrote to Sir David Manning with some
“personal
observations
on the overall intelligence picture”.113
“… as we
get closer to the deadline, it is increasingly likely that the
regime will hold
until the
invasion actually occurs. I am very comfortable with this
assessment.
A
pre- invasion implosion (eg assassination or successful coup)
cannot be excluded.”
319.
Mr Scarlett
suggested that, once an invasion was under way, Saddam
Hussein:
“… knows
the weaknesses of the Regular Army and does not expect them to
resist
effectively.
He may genuinely have better hopes for the Republican Guard and
place
some
reliance on their ability to delay the occupation of Baghdad and
other cities.
In his
mind, he may not need such delay to last for long.”
320.
Mr Scarlett
wrote that, “given the perceived inability of his enemies to
take
significant
casualties or setbacks”, some of the potential moves that Saddam
Hussein
could make,
as highlighted in the JIC Assessment, “might make to give us pause
even
after a
military operation begins”. Mr Scarlett wrote that those moves must
be taken
seriously.
He noted in particular:
•
“Attempted
use of CBW and missiles … immediately before an attack or
(in
Kuwait and
southern Iraq) in the early stages of the attack itself.” That
would
be “very
difficult to pull off”, but “even a small number of short range
artillery
rockets
getting through would have a disproportionate effect” and it was
“not
unreasonable
for Saddam to think it would give us second thoughts”.
•
“CBW armed
Al Hussein [ballistic missile] attack on Israel. Again very
difficult
to achieve,
but the benefits of success are obvious.”
112
Minutes, 29
January 2003, JIC meeting.
113
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: JIC Assessment and
Personal Observations’.
433