The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Charles
Duelfer [Dr Kay’s successor] into 2004 … or I was obviously
hearing
about them
because I was receiving reports from DCDI, who either himself went
to
Baghdad or
was conducting the contacts. So there was very regular
contact.”156
316.
During
June, Ministers and senior officials pressed the US to ensure a
rapid
start to
the ISG’s work.
317.
Mr Blair
raised with President Bush the urgent need to find and
promise
immunity to
personnel who had worked on Iraq’s WMD programmes.
318.
Shortly
afterwards, President Bush transferred responsibility for the
ISG
from
Secretary Rumsfeld to Mr Tenet.
319.
Mr Blair
met President Bush over breakfast at the G8 Summit in Evian
on
2 June.157
Mr Blair
said there was “an urgent problem” over WMD. The scientists
and
technicians
who would tell the truth about the WMD programme needed to be
found.
That meant
being ready to promise immunity, otherwise they would be too
frightened to
talk.
Mr Blair said he would look into whether there was a UK judge
or lawyer who might
be
appointed as Official Prosecutor with authority to agree plea
bargains.
320.
Following his
visit to Iraq, Mr Blair chaired a meeting on 3 June,
attended by
Mr Hoon,
Baroness Amos (the International Development Secretary), Sir
Michael Jay
(FCO
Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), in Mr Straw’s absence) and
No.10 officials,
which
discussed a range of issues (see
Section 10.1).158
321.
After the
meeting, Mr Cannon commissioned a number of papers to be
ready
before a
further meeting on 6 June, including advice on “a
judge/lawyer/interrogator to
negotiate
incentive/immunity packages for Iraqi WMD scientists and
officials”.
322.
Mr Watkins
wrote to Sir David Manning on 4 June about the need, given
the
continuing
media focus on WMD, for short- and medium-term strategies for
public
handling of
the search for WMD.159
323.
Mr Watkins
stated that the “most convincing evidence” of an illicit Iraqi
WMD
programme
remained “the alleged mobile BW trailers currently under
investigation” at
Baghdad
Airport. The draft of “a preliminary inter-agency report” suggested
that “one of
the
trailers was not capable of producing BW agent”. That was, however,
“likely to be
subject to
considerable revision”, and there was “a strong likelihood that the
eventual
conclusions
will be very close to our own”. There was “a lot of work to be
done” on the
issues,
including a further visit by UK experts.
156
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, pages 57-60.
157
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 2 June 2003, ‘Breakfast meeting between
the Prime Minister and
President
Bush: 2 June 2003’.
158
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
meeting’, 3 June’.
159
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 4 June 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD Detection and
Elimination: Public Handling’.
486