The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
on
improving essential services and Basrawi quality of life. External
investment is
growing
rapidly and the future economic prognosis of the region is very
positive.
Basrawis
are optimistic about their future. Our in-Theatre relationships
with the US
are very
strong and there is widespread US and Iraqi acknowledgement of the
UK’s
contribution
to this six-year campaign. Six of the eight remaining suspects
implicated
in the
murders of the RMP 6 in 2003 are now in custody. The conditions
have been
met and
plans made for transition to a more normal defence relationship
with Iraq.
UK combat
operations have now ceased ahead of schedule and the plan of
UK
drawdown is
well under way. UK Defence can withdraw from Iraq having
delivered
on this
promises and with its professional reputation intact. We must now
focus on
learning
the lessons.”
411.
Mr Prentice
updated the Iraq Strategy Group on 21 May on negotiations with
the
Iraqi
Government regarding the future of the UK military presence in
Iraq.167
412.
So far, UK
lobbying “had not yet got traction”. A meeting of the Council of
Ministers
on 26 May
was expected to be critical. In the absence of an agreement, Lt Gen
Wall told
the Group
that remaining UK personnel (naval trainers, a ship, personnel
embedded in
the MNF and
at the military academy) would need to be withdrawn.
413.
Mr McDonald
told the Group that it should consider whether failure to
secure
an
agreement was damaging in substance, or in presentational terms.
Mr Watkins
felt that
“on balance staying with an agreement would benefit the UK”. The
Group
considered
whether offering a reduced UK package might be helpful.
Mr Prentice
was given “delegated
authority on whether and how to offer Maliki different
options
on the UK
package”. Lt Gen Wall and Mr Watkins agreed to consider this
further and
offer guidance.
414.
Mr McDonald
told the Iraq Strategy Group that he saw “two conflicting
objectives”:
firstly
that the UK should not devote increasing effort to a diminishing
presence and
secondly
that it should not end its military presence in Iraq on “a sour
note, having
successfully
withdrawn from Basra”. Mr McDonald concluded that the UK
should make
a final
major effort before the 26 May meeting of the Council of Ministers,
including
reminding
them of the commitment Prime Minister Maliki made to Mr Brown
in April.
If that
failed, the UK should be ready to leave and should develop a
handling strategy.
Mr Brown
should be informed.
415.
Mr Prentice
confirmed that Ambassador Hill and Gen Odierno were clear that if
the
UK withdrew
it was because of the Iraqi Government’s stance, not a weakening of
the
UK’s
commitment.
416.
Mr Hutton
wrote to Mr Brown on 22 May to say that a Defence Memorandum
of
Understanding
looked “increasingly difficult to achieve”.168
Prime
Minister Maliki was
167
Minute
Wigan to McDonald, 21 May 2009, ‘Iraq Strategy Group, 21
May’.
168
Letter
Hutton to Brown, 22 May 2009, ‘Iraq: Negotiations on the Defence
MOU’.
452