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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
645.  When asked by the Inquiry whether the need and subsequent requests for different
levels of armouring was a feature of his time as GOC, Lt Gen Dutton replied:
“It must have been, but I don’t actually sort of recall it now … we were certainly
aware that, once the EFP arrived – we either needed to move people more by air or
we needed different tactics, techniques and procedures or we needed more heavily
armoured vehicles.”
646.  The Inquiry asked Lord Drayson whether action to improve the effectiveness
of electronic countermeasures or the level of protection afforded by Snatch was
suggested to him when he took office in May 2005.339 In a statement to the Inquiry
Lord Drayson wrote:
“The briefings at that time did not indicate that action was required on the
effectiveness of countermeasures against IEDs or the protection afforded by the
Snatch Land Rover … I was informed by the military advice that the Snatch was
essential to the UK’s style of operations in Iraq that required a small, light and highly
manoeuvrable vehicle to enable our troops to patrol in the narrow streets of Iraqi
towns. The view expressed by the military at that time was that a heavily armoured
tank like vehicle would not have been practical or consistent with the UK’s style
of patrolling ‘amongst the people’.”
647.  The Inquiry asked ACM Torpy whether the problem was that there was no
agreement on what an alternative vehicle should be able to do.340 He told the Inquiry
that different commanders had different views, but that was not the problem. The
problem was that “genuinely there was a lack of a product on the market” which could
replace Snatch.
648.  When asked if it was “ultimately pressure from Ministers” on the military chain
of command which had led to the acquisition of heavier patrol vehicles, ACM Torpy
replied that Lord Drayson had “created momentum for Mastiff to be introduced”, and
“provided leadership in the MOD to make sure something was delivered”. That provided
the in theatre commander with “another medium weight vehicle with a higher level
of protection”. There was “no doubt that Mastiff was welcomed by the people on the
ground” and that they “could undertake certain tasks”, but they “could not do what they
were doing with Snatch previously”.
649.  Asked why the pressure for a heavier vehicle had not come through the chain
of command, ACM Torpy added:
“I think there was always pressure from the … theatre … to the MOD. I think
the problem actually arises where you have an equipment programme which is
under‑funded and a desire … on the one hand to make sure that the capabilities
339  Statement, 15 December 2010, page 1.
340  Public hearing, 18 January 2011, pages 72‑73.
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