The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Mrs Patsy
Calton (Liberal Democrat) that it was his “duty to explain” why
he
thought it
was “necessary in certain circumstances to commit British
troops
to war”. If
Saddam Hussein was “in breach of the United Nations’ will
and
we refused
to act as an international community” it would “send a signal
to
Saddam that
we would do nothing to prevent him from building up
weapons
of mass
destruction” and “a signal that we were not serious about the issue
of
weapons of
mass destruction”. He understood why people felt that it was “a
very
distant
threat”, but what was dangerous was to do nothing: we would “rue
the
consequences
of that weakness later”.
465.
Mr Blair
had an internal meeting on Iraq with No.10 officials after PMQs
on
8 January.157
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair had said that, if Dr Blix found
nothing and
the UN gave
no specific sanction, it was going to be very hard to do.
Mr Blair felt that we
had to be
out there fairly soon making the case, that it was only a matter of
time before
Al Qaida
get their hands on WMD unless we show how serious we are at dealing
with
the WMD
issue. He was clear that it was the right thing to do, but also
accepted that
there was
not much support.
466.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 9 January that there would be an opportunity for
an
“in‑depth”
discussion on Iraq the following week.
467.
Mr Straw
was overseas on 9 January.158
468.
Mr Blair
told the Cabinet on 9 January that the inspection process was fully
under
way
and:
“The report
to the UN Security Council on 27 January was in no sense a
deadline,
rather a
first report of [the inspectors’] findings. Meanwhile, the build up
of military
forces was
necessary to sustain the pressure on Iraq.”159
469.
Points made
during the discussion included:
•
the
inspections process had its own integrity and should not be
compromised;
•
inspections
were being conducted against the background of a
concerted
Iraqi plan
to disperse and conceal WMD, including threats to execute
Iraqi
experts
involved with such programmes if they divulged information to the
UN
inspectors;
•
the onset
of summer in Iraq did not constitute an absolute deadline by
which
military
action would have to be taken; and
157
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
158
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
159
Cabinet
Conclusions, 9 January 2003.
84