The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
But an
attack could have unforeseen geo-political reverberations and is
not
assured of
rapid, complete success. If Saddam forced the US to undertake
a
lengthy and
destructive ‘siege’ of Baghdad … the chief beneficiaries would
be
AQ and
other terrorist groups.”
•
“We must
try to persuade the US that they need to do a lot more work to
clear
the way for
an attack on Iraq … We might also try to persuade them that
other
aspects of
the campaign against terrorism/WMD should have higher priority
…”
•
“If the US
persist with planning for an early attack on Iraq, the UK should
offer
that level
of support which the US might reasonably expect of a good
Ally
(i.e.
basing in DG [Diego Garcia] and Cyprus; niche capabilities). There
is
no objective
case for offering more.”
332.
Sir David
Manning gave Mr Blair an annotated agenda for the
meeting
on 23 July,
which was clearly intended to prepare Mr Blair for a telephone
call
to
President Bush and, possibly, the preparation of a Note as
suggested by
Mr Powell.
333.
Sir David
identified questions Mr Blair might ask and advised Mr Blair
that
there was
“a lot of ground to cover in a short time”.
334.
Sir David
Manning provided an annotated agenda for Mr Blair, which
indicated that
there would
be “a lot of ground to cover in a short time”.133
He
suggested Mr Blair should
invite:
•
Mr Scarlett
to set the scene with a “very brief summary” of the intelligence on
the
position
inside Iraq;
•
Sir Richard
Dearlove to provide a “brief account of his recent talks
with
[Mr George]
Tenet [Director Central Intelligence] and Condi [Rice]”. Sir
Richard
had
returned from Washington “convinced that the Administration have
moved
up a gear”;
and
•
Adm Boyce
to describe current US military planning for a campaign against
Iraq.
335.
Sir David
suggested that those presentations would “throw up a number of
key
questions”,
including:
•
the “legal
base” for action against Iraq;
•
whether US
military plans were viable;
•
whether the
US could find the necessary bases;
•
whether
there was a particular role for UK forces, the lead time
necessary
to prepare
them and when we would have to make funding available and
on
what
scale;
133
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq Meeting: 23 July:
Annotated Agenda’.
58