The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
rather than
talking about it. If that requires getting into the detail of it
yourself,
then do
it”.
•
Rebuilding
Iraqi civil society – “we need to take capacity building seriously
and
reinforce
the judiciary, Ministries etc. You should demand to see a
plan.”
•
Ensuring
that the new Iraqi Government was firmly “in charge, even if this
is
difficult
for us. We cannot count on Allawi winning, and indicating we
support him
is probably
the kiss of death. But we do need a strong national unity
government
that puts
an end to sectarianism. I am very uncomfortable about the
secret
guarantee
we appear to have given the Kurds and Shia on federalism …
This
could come
back to haunt us in a big way.”
•
Developing a
new strategy for Basra “to be set by the military on the ground
with
stronger
political support in the consulate [the British Embassy Office
Basra]”.
238.
Mr Powell
also emphasised to Mr Blair the importance of making sure that
the UK’s
policy was
properly understood:
“… you need
to start making the argument again both internationally
and
domestically
instead of keeping silent. We have to explain why this battle
matters,
and why it
is not in the interest of the rest of the world to watch Iraq going
down
the tubes.
You need to convince both audiences that there is light at the end
of the
tunnel, and
that we have a plan for stabilising Iraq. You should define
success. It
does not
mean an end to all terrorist attacks, any more than it does in NI
[Northern
Ireland] or
Palestine. But it does mean that we split the reconcilable from
the
irreconcilable
insurgents, that the Iraqi government and security forces can
control
the
situation, that jobs are being created and that something
resembling civil society
is
beginning to emerge under a democratically elected
government.
“Announce a
revised strategy … we have lost credibility and you have
to
reassure
people that there is a plan that will work … Make your speech on
Iraq
– Lord
Mayor’s Banquet – and then get a real debate going in the country
and
internationally
rather than trying to stay silent. People have to understand why
it
matters to
them. And challenge the UN and international community to play
their
role.”
239.
Mr Powell’s
note concluded:
“The people
dealing with Iraq, particularly in the front line, are not
surprisingly tired
and
discouraged. Nothing seems to work, and they have given up trying
to come up
with new
ideas. A weary cynicism and feeling that it is all inevitable has
sunk in. It
always does
in wars. The job of leadership is to raise their sights, inspire
them with a
vision of
how the war can be won, set a new strategy, and then ensure it has
public
support. If
we can’t do that, we are sunk. But it is doable, and we should not
give up.
A meeting
right after Conference with JR [Dr
Reid], JS [Mr Straw], military etc.”
528