9.3  |  July 2004 to May 2005

confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces and had “expressed a desire to mobilise JAM”

in order to provide effective election security.

436.  Mr Collis commented: “While all this suggests widespread determination to vote,

there is also the risk of increased violence with militias on the streets and the IPS

[Iraqi Police Service] nervous of attack.”

437.  Mr Hoon and Gen Walker met Mr Blair on 21 January.232 At the meeting,233

Gen Walker advised that the US campaign against the insurgency had stalled and the

US was reviewing its operations. The UK “needed to recognise that if our voice was to

count with the US we would have to offer to play a part in the plan that emerged”.

438.  If the UK wanted to resist the likely request to extend its operation beyond

MND(SE), it would need to accept reduced influence in strategic discussions about

MNF-I strategy. Gen Walker did not consider the insurgency to be growing, but popular

support for it was.

439.  The record of the meeting stated:

“The Prime Minister said the bottom line was that we had to complete the mission.

The key question was when we could hand responsibility for security over to the

ISF. CDS [Gen Walker] said it very much depended on the environment. Muthanna

and Basra were reasonably calm. But it was not clear that they would stay that way

without any MNF presence …

“The Prime Minister said he was only prepared to redeploy UK forces beyond our

current area of operations if there was a viable plan or product. But he was not

prepared simply to follow along with US wishes. We needed to have a coherent plan

to do the job … Simply asking us to take over MND(CS) was not a plan.”

440.  Mr Blair and President Bush spoke by video conference on 25 January and

discussed messaging around the imminent election.234 Mr Blair considered that talking

publicly about withdrawal would smack of defeat. Rather, he suggested that: “Our aim

was to make our role redundant.”

441.  Mr Blair said that he would speak to Mr Annan before the election and encourage

him to be positive about the impact of the vote. White House and No.10 staff would

speak about the media plans for the days after the election.

442.  At the last meeting of the AMHGIR before the Iraqi elections, the FCO gave a

detailed briefing on the elections and the process required to form a government.235

232  Letter Phillipson to Baker, 21 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Future Strategy’.

233  The Inquiry Secretary, Ms Aldred, was present at this meeting.

234  Letter Phillipson to Owen, 25 January 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush,

25 January: Iraq’.

235  Minutes, 26 January 2005, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

465