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9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007
that the Iraqi Government has a near monopoly of force by the time the coalition
withdraws the bulk of our forces …
“We will through our continued presence over the next few years need to provide
the Iraqis with the necessary breathing space to build up their capabilities … We will
need to be careful to avoid the impression that we are ready to take on Shia militias
in order to restore Sunni dominance …
“If we are to avoid a descent into civil war and anarchy then preventing the Jaysh
al Mahdi (JAM) from developing into a state within a state, as Hizballah has done
in Lebanon, will be a priority … Our efforts must be in support of a clear Iraqi
Government strategy and we should avoid getting into a position where we are
seen to be confronting the militias alone.”
94.  Mr Patey concluded:
“This is a 5‑10 year project and it will be messy and difficult … The consequences
of failure are very high indeed. We need to get the balance right about assuring our
friends that we will not abandon them and a credible exit strategy. Too much talk of
an early exit could weaken our position.”
95.  Commenting on Mr Patey’s telegram, Lt Gen Fry observed:
“I would place the betting on national break‑up or democratic transition at closer
to evens, but William captures the all to play for atmosphere of the moment.”66
96.  In Lt Gen Fry’s opinion, although “in technical terms” there was not a civil war, he
increasingly suspected that “what is being fought in the Baghdad – Baqubah corridor
is a civil war in cameo, with implications which extend well beyond the immediate
battlefield … The battle for Baghdad therefore becomes the battle for Iraq, and
maybe more.”
97.  In his first weekly report on 21 July, Maj Gen Shirreff assessed: “I cannot see how,
given the level of attacks against coalition forces, we can claim that Maysan is green …
in my view it is at best yellow.”67 He judged:
“The only way we will get to green is by removing the problem, which means
extracting ourselves as quickly as possible from Camp Abu Naji which acts as
nothing more than a tethered goat for attacks out of al‑Amara. I do not intend to
occupy Camp Sparrowhawk, an idea whose time has passed and another tethered
goat in the making. I will retain a presence in Maysan but, instead, focus on the key
issues: disruption and interdiction on the border, while, at the same time, continuing
the SSR [Security Sector Reform] effort to get the Province to green.”
66  Minute Fry to PSO/CDS, 23 July 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (219): 23 July 2006’.
67  Minute Shirreff, 21 July 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 21 July 2006’.
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