9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
that the
Iraqi Government has a near monopoly of force by the time the
coalition
withdraws
the bulk of our forces …
“We will
through our continued presence over the next few years need to
provide
the Iraqis
with the necessary breathing space to build up their capabilities …
We will
need to be
careful to avoid the impression that we are ready to take on Shia
militias
in order to
restore Sunni dominance …
“If we are
to avoid a descent into civil war and anarchy then preventing the
Jaysh
al Mahdi
(JAM) from developing into a state within a state, as Hizballah has
done
in Lebanon,
will be a priority … Our efforts must be in support of a clear
Iraqi
Government
strategy and we should avoid getting into a position where we
are
seen to
be confronting the militias alone.”
“This is a
5‑10 year project and it will be messy and difficult … The
consequences
of failure
are very high indeed. We need to get the balance right about
assuring our
friends
that we will not abandon them and a credible exit strategy. Too
much talk of
an early
exit could weaken our position.”
95.
Commenting on
Mr Patey’s telegram, Lt Gen Fry observed:
“I would
place the betting on national break‑up or democratic transition at
closer
to evens,
but William captures the all to play for atmosphere of the
moment.”66
96.
In Lt Gen
Fry’s opinion, although “in technical terms” there was not a civil
war, he
increasingly
suspected that “what is being fought in the Baghdad – Baqubah
corridor
is a civil
war in cameo, with implications which extend well beyond the
immediate
battlefield …
The battle for Baghdad therefore becomes the battle for Iraq,
and
maybe more.”
97.
In his first
weekly report on 21 July, Maj Gen Shirreff assessed: “I cannot see
how,
given the
level of attacks against coalition forces, we can claim that Maysan
is green …
in my view
it is at best yellow.”67
He
judged:
“The only
way we will get to green is by removing the problem, which
means
extracting
ourselves as quickly as possible from Camp Abu Naji which acts
as
nothing
more than a tethered goat for attacks out of al‑Amara. I do not
intend to
occupy Camp
Sparrowhawk, an idea whose time has passed and another
tethered
goat in the
making. I will retain a presence in Maysan but, instead, focus on
the key
issues:
disruption and interdiction on the border, while, at the same time,
continuing
the SSR
[Security Sector Reform] effort to get the Province to
green.”
66
Minute Fry
to PSO/CDS, 23 July 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (219): 23 July
2006’.
67
Minute
Shirreff, 21 July 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 21
July 2006’.
19