3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
520.
Recognising
that the debate would need to “take full account” of
Dr Blix
and Dr ElBaradei’s
reports to the Security Council on 27 January and 14
February,
Mr Blair
set out a number of elements that “might form the basis for our
debate
and the conclusions
we draw”. Those included:
•
Reaffirming
the EU position agreed at the 27 January meeting of the
General
Affairs and
External Relations Committee (GAERC), “particularly the
full
implementation
of UNSCR 1441 to achieve the objective of Iraqi
disarmament
of all its
WMD. Iraq must comply fully, actively, immediately and
unconditionally
with its
international obligations”.
•
Clarity
about the implications of resolution 1441. OP2 had given Iraq a
final
opportunity
to comply: “But Saddam had not taken that opportunity. His
false
statements
and omissions in the December declaration and failure to
co-
operate
fully with the inspectors are a material breach of the resolution
[OP4]”.
So, as OP13
made “explicit”, Saddam faced “serious consequences”.
•
Military
action was a last resort, but the Council “must make it clear that
no
Member
State rules it out if needed to uphold the authority of the
Security
Council. We
should also be clear that in the absence of full and
immediate
co‑operation,
the UNSC should move quickly to a second resolution.”
•
Maintaining
and increasing the pressure on Saddam: “Time is now running
very
short.
There is still a last opportunity for Saddam to co-operate
unconditionally
with the
international community’s demands or to leave. But failing that,
we
should be
clear Saddam faces immediate and serious
consequences.”
•
The EU
should ensure it was ready to contribute to humanitarian
and
reconstruction
issues.
•
Addressing
the regional implications of the crisis by “underlining …
the
importance
we attach to early progress towards a lasting settlement
between
Israelis
and Palestinians on the basis of the Road Map”.
521.
Mr Straw
wrote to his Cabinet colleagues on 14 February, reiterating the
point
he had made
in Cabinet on 6 February, about the importance of maintaining
contacts
with
members of the Security Council in “the crucial period leading up
to consideration
of a new
resolution on Iraq”.139
The
position of the 10 elected Members of the Security
Council
(the E10)140
would be
crucial.
522.
Mr Blair
discussed Iraq, including the different expectations of what
would
constitute
a material breach and the time required to bring people together
and avoid
further
polarisation, with Mr Annan on 16 February.141
Mr Blair
said the time required
was the
time needed to “make a judgement on whether Iraq was
co-operating”.
139
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Contacts with
Members of the
Security Council’.
140 Angola,
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain
and Syria.
141
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 16 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with UN Secretary
General, 16
February’.
273