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6.4  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003
918.  Mr Lee also recorded that he had agreed with Dr Brewer that development of
military campaign objectives needed to take account of humanitarian concerns.
919.  The Inquiry considers that Ms Short’s exclusion reflected No.10’s position
on her participation in the making of policy on Iraq. Ministerial decision-making is
addressed in more detail in Section 2.
920.  The discussion of DFID (and DTI) involvement in military planning by the Chiefs of
Staff on 8 January 2003 is described later in this Section.
921.  Dr Brewer told the Inquiry that the proportion of her time spent on Iraq changed
significantly over that period:
“By about mid-December 2002 and then until early April 2003 it was taking up
most of my time, displacing most of my other responsibilities as DG Regional
Programmes. I handed over direct supervision of DFID’s Iraq operations to Suma
Chakrabarti a few weeks before Clare Short resigned in May 2003.”445
922.  Dr Brewer explained:
“From autumn 2002, Suma Chakrabarti and I kept under constant review staffing
levels and responsibilities on Iraq, how work on Iraq was going, and the impact that
our workload on Iraq was having on other DFID work in my areas of responsibility. In
early April 2003, he and I agreed that he should take over from me direct supervision
of DFID work on Iraq for the following reasons:
– co-ordination between DFID and OGDs, in particular MOD but also No.10,
FCO and Cabinet Office, had significantly improved (which had been one of
my key immediate tasks);
– the issue was reputationally critical for DFID, and therefore one on which the
Permanent Secretary naturally needed to be engaged; and
– for me, as the relevant DG, as well as the Permanent Secretary also to
continue to spend a considerable proportion of time on Iraq, risked both
duplication of senior level supervision and significant neglect of the rest of my
responsibilities.”446
FCO preparation for handling an “all-out crisis”
923.  In December 2002, the FCO introduced new machinery to manage its work
on Iraq.
445  Statement, 12 September 2010, page 1.
446  Statement, 12 September 2010, page 14.
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