6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
845.
The meeting
between Adm Boyce and Gen Myers added weight to the
view
that US
timelines were slipping, in part because of the UN process. There
was “some
sympathy
with the UK position”.338
846.
CENTCOM was
described as “coming round” to the northern option. That
would
depend on
Turkey’s co‑operation. Gen Myers was reported to
have:
•
accepted
Adm Boyce’s “point that some overt preparations would send
an
entirely
appropriate signal to Saddam immediately after” adoption of the
UN
resolution,
“rather than doing nothing until actual signs of
resolution‑bending”;
•
recognised
the value a UK divisional HQ “might bring in providing a ‘home’
for
any
coalition contributions”; and
•
stated that
“Much planning” was taking place in the US on
post‑conflict
considerations.
847.
The record of
the meeting was sent to Sir David Manning, who commented
to
Mr Powell
that it was “Evidence” that US plans were “now slipping” and that
it put the
UK decision
“in context”.339
848.
The minutes of
the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 28 October recorded
that:
“The US
understood the reasons why the UK could not commit while the
UNSCR
was under
discussion.”
849.
While US
military staff “continued to work to planning timelines prescribed”
by
President
Bush in August 2002:
“Senior US
officials had begun to acknowledge that there could be a
requirement
for these
timelines to be altered. It would be important for the UK to try to
influence
a shift of
several weeks rather than incremental shifts that mirrored the
delay in the
signing of
the UNSCR.”340
850.
The minutes
stated that the UK’s ability to influence the US was diminishing
as
time
advanced, “particularly as the US had now decided to commit” the
4th Infantry
Division to
the northern axis. Adm Boyce directed that “UK planning for either
a western
or southern
axis was not to commence ahead of a political decision on UK
commitment”.
851.
The minutes
also stated that “it would be important to emphasise
within
forthcoming
submissions that, although Package 3 might be considered
expensive,
the
alternative of committing to op[eration]s during the aftermath
would also require
considerable
resources”.
338
Minute
MA/CDS to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 29 October 2002, ‘CDS
Bilateral Meeting with
Gen Myers
– US CJCS – 26 Oct 02’.
339
Manuscript
comment Manning on Minute MA/CDS to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 29
October 2002,
‘CDS
Bilateral meeting with Gen Myers – US CJCS – 26 Oct
02’.
340
Minutes, 28
October 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
305